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CHAPTF'...J\ I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Thesis 
The problem of this thesis is to compare and contrast the theories 
of evolution of Henri Bergson and Samuel Alexander. Alexander' s system 
belongs to the naturalistic tradition and its guiding principles are the 
analytical and empirical methods. Bergson ' s system belongs to that spe-
cial group of Idealistic positions which has come to be known as Vital-
ism. It also relies on the empirical method, but leans towards intuition 
for the apprehension of the nature of reality. It wi 11 be one of the 
purposes of the thesis to explore how and where these two systems ap-
proach or agree with each other in their conclusions, and where they 
differ in their respective treatments of the same problem of evolution. 
2. Literature and Limitations 
The two main sources which form the basis of the study are 
Samuel Alexander' s Space, Time, and Deity, and Henri Bergson' s Creative 
Evolution. The main arguments for the theories of evolution of these 
tuo authors can be said to have been stated in these tt-vo primary sources. 
In the case of Samuel Alexander, the two volilllle s of Space, Time, and Deity 
cover almost all aspects of the author ' s metaphysical position as related 
to the theory of evolution, and reference to other works of Alexander has 
not been found necessary for the purposes of this thesis . In developing 
the argument for emergent evolution, reference has been made to another 
primary source of a contemporary philosopher in the field, c. Lloyd Horgan ' s 
1 
2 
Emergent Evol ution, as Alexander is in general aereement with the latter ' s 
position. In the case of Henri Ber gson, though the main argument as l aid 
down in Creative Evoluti on has been cl osel y followed, references have been 
made to such other works of the author as An Introduction to Metaphysics, 
The Two Sources of Horali ty and Rel igion, and Time and Free Will. The sum-
mary of the main areuments for Cr eative Evolution has been taken from The 
~ Sources of Morality and Rel igion, and the same source has provided 
some material for the discussion of the first and final cause in Bereson1 s 
scheme . The exposition of Bergson ' s position on free will and determina-
tion as stated in Creative Fvol ution had to be augmented largely by his 
statement of the case in Time and Free lofill . 
As regards secondary sources , one of the chief ones consul ted Has 
a Boston Universit.y Ph.D. Dissertation of 1954 by A. H. Kauffman entitled 
Elan Vital, Nisus , and Creativity. The works in the history of philosophy 
consul ted include that of Thilly and 1-lood, A Histort of Philosophy, and 
those edited by s. Radhakrishnan, A History of Philosophy Eastern and 
:·lestern, and Vereilius Ferm, A History of Philosophical Systems. In 
various other sections , such as the one on historical perspectives, 
secondary sources as relevant to the topic have been consulted, and have 
been listed in the bibliography. The use of such secondary sources has 
of necessity been restricted, and does not in any i'ay P,xhaust the existing 
literature in the field. 
3. The Methodology of the Thesis 
The problem will be developed in three ~ain stages: first, a 
study of the method and epistemoloeY of the tivO philosophers; secondly, 
a study of their conceptions of the nature of reality; thirdly, a considera-
tion of the treatment of the concept of evolution, its direction and goal; 
and a final chapter on findings and conclusions . 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD AND EPISTEMOIOOY 
1 . Method in Metaphysics 
i . Alexander ' s empirical method 
Metaphysics, according to Alexander, differs from the special 
sciences not so much in its method, as in the nature of the subjects 
with which it deals .1 The nature of subjects with which philosophy 
deals are of a peculiarly comprehensive kind: 
Metaphysics is thus an attempt to study these very compre-
hensive topics, to describe the ultimate nature of exis-
tence if it has ~, and these pervasive characters of 
things, or categories .2 
Philosophy is also said to be characterized by the unity of 
spirit or the 'habit of seeing things together.' 3 The special sciences, 
in Alexander ' s opinion, are outgrowths from philosophy, or "specific 
bodies of facts (which) are separated from the general body of knowledge 
which is called philosophy .u4 
There being no difference in its spirit between the sciences and 
philosophy, the method of philosophy for Alexander is the same as that of 
the special sciences 1 viz . empirical. Alexander further clarifies the 
connotation of the term empirical as he uses it: 
1 . s. Alexander, Space, Time , and Deity, (New York: The Humanities Press , 
1950) , P• 1. Hereafter this book will be referred to as S.T.D. 
2. S .T.D. I, p . 2 . 
3. S.T.D. I , p.J . 
4. S.T.D. I , p.J. 
4 
It will proceed like them(special sciences) by reflective 
description and analysis of its special subject matter. 
It will like them use nypotheses by which to bring its 
data into verifiable connection. • • But the word empiri-
cal must not be too closely pressed. It is intended to 
mean nothing more than the method used in the special 
sciences . l 
The word empirical is also held to be equivalent to experiential. 
The subject matter of philosophy is however, non-empirical or 
a-priori, and in the method here employed, what we know is apprehended 
5 
in some form of experience, whether it pertains to the variable(empirical), 
or to the pervasive(non- empirical or categorial ) • All alike are parts 
of the experienced world: 
Philosophy may therefore be described as the experiential 
or empirical study of the non- empirical or a-priori, and 
of such questions as arise out of the relation of the 
empirical to the a-priori . It is thu.s itself one of the 
sciences delimited from the others by its special subject-
matter. 2 
A further qualification which Alexander imposes on the use of the 
term empirical is that he does not claim a prerogative in it for sense-
experience: "Sensations , though integral parts of experience are not the 
only ones .n3 Thoughts are vital features of experience , and the possi-
bility of experiences simpler and of a lower order than sensation itself 
is admitted. For Alexander, the contrast of thought and sense is irrele-
vant . 4 
In his preface Alexander describes his method as "purely metaphysical, 
1. S.T.D. I , P• 4. 
2. Ibid. 
3. S.T.D. I , P• 5. 
4. Ibid . 
a piece of pl odding analysis ."l There is a difference which he emphasises 
between science and metaphysics in that metaphysics leaves no notions un-
explained. Alexander confesses to a horror for notions which remain unex-
pl ained, or which the mind takes f or ult imate and undefinable . For him 
there can exist no notions which are indescribable or incapable of identi-
fication in concrete experience: 
Now ~ point has been that when you examine such notions 
and try to find what it is in experience you are dealing 
with, and you do not treat them as if they might be manu-
factured articles, you find certain characteristics of 
Space-Time . You may legitimately use these notions in 
defini ng Jarts of Space- Time , but the notions are them-
selves o y expressions in thought of experienced features 
of Space- Time itself. 2 
The attitude of mind which is imposed by the empirical method is 
the atti tude of realism; that is , one that treats finite minds as one 
among the many forms of finite existence , and denies to mind any special 
6 
or priveleged position.3 This attitude has an important bearing on episte-
mology: 
It follows that for the empirical method the problem of 
knowledge, the subject matter of epistemology, is nothing 
but a chapter, though an important one , in the wider ~cience 
of metaphysics, and not its indispensable foundation. 4 
Such a doctrine also goes by the name of naturalism, and here , Alexander 
is content to be on the side of Spinoza. 
In the opinion of Thi~ and Wood, the exposition of Alexander in 
Space, Time , and Deity represents the high- water mark of modern British 
1. S .T.D. I , P• vi . 
2. S . T . D. I , P• ix. 
3. S.T.D. I , P• 6. 
4. S.T.D. I , P• 7. 
realism: 
British realism attained its most systematic expression 
in the writings of Sanuel Alexander and Alfred North 
Whitehead, both of wham formulated epistemological realism 
in the context of a naturalistic metaphysics -- a naturalism 
which, however, revolts against the mechanism of traditional 
materialism. l 
Roy Wood Sellars describes the new materialism as thoroughly empirical 
but not positivistic . It is also evolutionary and holds that novel 
wholes can arise through integrative causality: 
1-iodern materialism moves up and down frOI:l the human to the 
biological and the inorganic; and back ag~in . Only so can 
the proper balance be kept . • • The new materialism is tho-
roughly empirical but not positivistic and phenomenalistic . 
It retains the natural human awareness of a knower who is 
also an agent . It handles as it observes.2 
In regard to Alexander's position with respect to idealism, the 
real difference according to him, between idealism and realism, lies in 
their starting points or the spirit of their methods: 
For the one in some form or other, hol-Jever ,mch disguised, 
mind is the measure of things and the starting point of in-
quiry. The sting of absolute idealism lies in its assertion 
that the parts of the world are not ultimately real or true 
but only the whole is true . For realism, mind has no prive-
leged pl ace except in its perfection. The real issue is be-
tween these two spirits of inquiry. 3 
Alexander expresses the view that he would be glad if the terms idealism 
and realism could be got rid of altogether, and actually states that he 
1 . Frank Thilly and Ledger Wood, A Histo~ of Ph:llosop~, 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, l9 ) , P• 606. rether or not 
Thilly and Wood are correct in so describing Whitehead, there can 
be little question about the accuracy of their estimate of Alexander . 
2 . R. w. Sellars, "The New Materialism", A History of Philosophical 
Systems, ed. V. Farm, P• 422 . 
) . S.T.D. I , P• 8. 
7 
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is not anxious to overestimate differences "from a school of thought in 
which I was myself bred, and to whose leaders, Mr. Bradley and 1-Ir . Bosanquet, 
I owe so JIDlCh of whatever capacity I may have attained .nl. 
As a result of purely metaphysical analysis of Space-Time on the 
basis of empirical existence, Alexander finds that his conclusions are 
"in essence and spirit identical with Minkowski's conception of an abso-
lute world of our dimensions, of which the three dimensional world of 
geometry omits the element of time .n2 The conclusions are also compatible 
with Einstein's principle of Relativity which is built on the fram;,work 
of Minkowski ' s geometry. Thilly and Wood have described Alexander 1 s work 
as a remarkable philosophical s.ynthesis . Among the elements which have 
been incorporated in some form or another in Alexander ' ~ s.ynthesis, are, 
according to Thilly and Wood: 1) the theory of relativity; 2) Bergson' s 
creative evolutionism; 3) the direct realism of Moore, Russell, and the 
American New Realists; 4) an empirical theory of knowledge in the British 
tradition; 5) a theory of value - human freedom, and Deity allied tel the 
British idealistic school of Bradley and Bosanquet . 3 
ii • Bergson 1 s method of philosophy 
In his An Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson distinguishes be-
tween two "profoundly different" ways of knowing a thing: 
The first implies that we move round the object; the second, 
that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of 
view at which we are placed and on the ~bols by which we 
1. S.T.D. I, P• 7. 
2 . S.T.D. I, P• 87 . 
3. Thilly and Wood, p . 606 . 
express ourselves . The second neither depends on a point 
of view nor relies on any symbol . The first kind of know-
ledge m~ be said to stop at the relati ve; the second, in 
those cases where it is possible , to attain the absolute . l 
He illustrates the difference between these two points of view by two 
examples ; first , the movement of an object in space, and second, a 
character from a novel. In both cases, Bergson demonstrates the failure 
of any attempt to grasp the essence of the movement or character from 
without: 
But that which is properly himBelf, that which constitutes 
his essence , cannot be perceived from without, being inter-
nal by definition, nor be expressed by symbols , being in-
commensurable with everything else . Description, history, 
and analysis leave me here in the relative . Coincidence 
with the person himself would alone give me the absolute . 2 
Bergson draws a clear line of demarcation between the roles of 
intellect and intuition, and according to Thilly, this distinction is 
based on his dualistically tinged metaphysics . 3 Writing on his method 
of philosopt~, he speaks of the necessity for a reconciliation between 
the inert and the living; an opposition or dualism, which for him is the 
same as that which is found between the inorganic and the organized, be-
tween instinct and intelligence. The basis of reconciliation is provided 
by consciousness which forms the background from which both derive : 
1 . 
Intellectua.J.ity and materi ality have been constituted 
in detail, by reciprocal adaptation . Both are derived 
from a wider and higher fonn of existence . It is there 
that w, must replace them, in order to see them issue 
forth.4 
H. Bergson, An Introduction to Metalh~sics . , trans . T. E. Hulme, 
(New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 9 5), P• 21. 
2. ~., P • 22 . 
3. Thilly and Wood, P • 579. 
4. H. Bergson, Creative Evol ution, trans . A. Mitchell, (New York: 
Random House, 1944) , P • 204 . Hereafter this book will be referred 
to as CE . 
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Intelligence and intellect aim at getting matter to act on matter, and 
according to Bergson, the same movement by which the mind is brought to 
form itself into intellect, or concepts, breaks up matter into separate 
objects; "The more consciousness is intellectualized, the more is matter 
spatialized."l The same would hold true for metaphysics when it deduces 
10 
a priori the categories of thought . So Bergson deprecates the exaggerated 
confidence of philosopey in the powers of the individual mind. He writes 
of the function of human intelligence: 
To act and to know that we are acting , to cone in touch with 
reality and even to live it , but only in the neasure in which 
it concerns the work that is being accomplished and the fUrrow 
that is being plowed, such is the function of human intelli-
gence ••• Phllosopb;y can only be an effort to dissolve again 
into the Whole . Intelligence reabsorbed into its principle, 
may thus live back again its own genesis .2 
The attempt to arrive at a genesis of intellect leads Bergson to 
the intimate connection of the theory of knowledge with life, consciousness, 
and reality; and in fact this is his starting point, arising from the fall-
ure of the intellect to adequately account for the phenomenon of 1~: 
This amounts to sccy-ing that theory of knowledge and theory of 
life seem to us inseparable ••• On the other hand, a theory 
of knowledge which does not replace the intellect in the gen-
eral evolution of life will teach us neither how the frames 
of knowledge have been constructed nor how we can enlarge or 
go beyond them. It is necessary that these two inquiries, 
theory of knowledge and theory of life , should join each other, 
and, by a circular process, push each other on unceasingly. 3 
Elsewhere, Bergson indicates how the attempt to take into account 
the two faculties,intellect and intuition, leads on to the study of 
1. C.E., P• 207. 
2. C.E., P• 210. 
3. C.E., P• xxiv. 
evolution: 
The double form of consciousness is then due to the double 
form of the real, and theory of lmowledge must be dependent 
upon metaphysics . In fact , each of these two lines of thought 
leads to the other; they form a circle , and there can be no 
other centre to the circle but the empirical study of evolu-
tion. It is only in seeing consciousness run through matter, 
lose itself there and find itself there again, divide and re-
constitute itself, that we shall form an idea of the mutual 
op~o~itfon of the two terms, as also perhaps, of their common 
orl.gJ.n . 
ll 
On the subject of the empirical study of evolution it is necessary 
to distinguish clearly the difference in approach between Alexander and 
Bergson. Alexander describes evolution as the "emerbence" of new quali-
ties : 
But as in the course of Time new complexity of motions 
comes into existence, a new quality emerges, that is, a 
new complex possesses as a matter of observed empirical 
fact a new or emergent quality .2 
The word "emergence" which was taken over from G. H. Lewes, was used by 
him to distinguish between an "empirical" treatment of nature, and one 
that he called 11metempirical11 .3 Emergence , therefore, is a eypothesis 
of inductive science to be weighed on available evidence, and it has been 
suggested that Lewes would have regarded emergent evolution as empirical, 
and creative evolution as typically metempirical .4 The idea of creative 
evolution is favoured b,y the holders of the group of ideas known as Vitalism, 
lofhich "brings to the whole of philosophy the image , as it were , of life •115 
1 . C .E. , p . 196. 
2. S.T.D. II, P• 45. 
3. "Emergence", Ency. Brit., (1957) , VIII, p . 390f . 
4. Ibid. 
5. A. Bemdtson, "Vitalism," A.H. O.P .s., ed. V. Ferm. 
The leading representatives of Vitalistic philosop~ are Nietzsche and 
Bergson. Arthur Berndtson describes Vitalism as follows: 
As thus understood, Vitalism is anti- rationalistic and prag-
matic, holding that universals and fixed principles are not 
factors in the real , but merely instruments for the action of 
living things . It is idealistic both in the ontological sense, 
identifying the real with something akin to spirit, and in the 
epistemological sense, classing many of the objects of knowledge 
as appearances dependent on cognition. It regards time and 
change as fundamental , and favors an evolutionary and historical 
outlook. It is revisionist in its ethics , and rejects eternal 
norms and external imper atives . It is explicitly non- theistic: 
partly pantheistic: and endowed with a profoundly religious 
sense in its feeling for a universal and self- transcending 
creativity. l 
Another feature of Bergson's method which needs to be noted in 
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comparison to Alexander ' s is his treatment of the relation between science 
and philosophy. Positive science is the work of pure intellect, according 
to Bergson, and the intellect is at home in the presence of unorganized 
matter. 2 The forms of logic, geometry, mechanical invention, are all 
convenient tools or outlets of intellectual activity. The intellect, 
however, fails in Bergson ' s view to treat adequately of the living, and 
it is bare that philosophy llDlSt take over: 
The duty of philosophy should be t o intervene here actively, 
to examine the living without any reservation as to practical 
utility, by freeing itself from forms and habits that are 
strictly intellectual. Its own special object is to speculate, 
that is to say, to see; its attitude toward the living should 
not be that of science , which aims only at action, and which, 
being able to act only by means of inert matter, presents to 
itself the rest of reality in this single respect . 3 
One consequence of such an attitude is that it places science, 
1. Ibid . Philosophical Vitalism is not to be confused with the bio-
logical Vitalism of such men as Driesch and Preesman. 
2. C.E., P• 214. 
3. C. E., P• 2J5 . 
theory of knowledge, and metaphysics on the same ground: 
Philosophy, then, invades the domain of experience. She 
busies herself with many things ••• Science, theory of 
knowledge and metaphysics find themselves on the same 
ground. l 
Philosopny, thus , needs to superimpose on scientific truth a knowledge 
13 
of another kind - metaphysical knowledge . Knowledge of reality is reached, 
for Bergson, by the "combined and progressive development of science and 
philosophy" .2 
It may be noted that on the subject of method in philosophy, the 
significance or connotation attached to experience is not quite the same 
for Alexander and Bergson. The dualistic tinge in Bergson's metaphysics 
runs through every phase of his argument and applies to his distinction be-
tween scientific truth and metaphysical knowledge, even though he equates 
the problem of knowledge with that of metapQysics. For Bergson, science 
is wholly dependent on the intellect, and philosophy needs must superimpose 
upon scientific knowledge another kind of truth or knowledge -- metaphysical 
lmowledge, which draws not upon the intellect, but the intuitive apprehen-
sion of reality. For Alexander, there is no dualism in his conception of 
experience: 11Any experience whatever may be analysed into two distinct 
elerents and their relation to one another .n3 Also, the empirical method 
in philosophy is held to be equivalent to experiential. 4 This would tend 
to lessen the gulf between science and philosophy in the case of Alexander, 
1. c .E., p . 217 . 
2. C.E., P• 218. 
3. S .T.D. I , P• 11. 
4. S.T.D. I, P• 4. 
especially in view of his statement at the very outset that metaphysics 
differs from the special sciences, not in toothod so much as in the nature 
of subjects dealt with. l A fUrther distinction or difference between the 
two s,ystems is brought out by the fact that for Alexander, the a-priori 
or the non-ampirical elements of things are experienced, just as much as the 
empirical ones, whereas the function of science and the intellect for 
Bergson is restricted to the inorganic world and cannot treat adequately 
of the organic world. 
2. The Problem of Knowledge 
i . Alexander 
The theory of knowledge for Alexander as he states in his preface, 
and repeats in his introduction, is "not the foundation of metaphysics, 
but only a chapter of it, which it takes in its stride .~2 In accordance 
with this naturalistic doctrine, consciousness is described as a "quality 
of a certain sort of nervous organization, in a certain condition of func-
tioning .n3 In the situation of knowing, distinction is made between the 
mind and the object by the description: "the mind enjoys itself and the 
object is contemplated. 114 Enjoyment and contemplation are not separate 
acts, but the mind in enjoying itself, has before it, and therefore con-
templates, the object . Contemplation, in other words, is a name for the 
same act as enjoyment, only in reference to the object.S Alexander re-
1. S .T.D. I, p. 1 . 
2 .. S. T. D. I, P• xiii. 
3· S . T.D. I, P• xiv. 
4. S . T. D. I, P• xiv. 
s. Ibid . 
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gards enjoyment on the analogy of the animal's or plant ' s reaction to 
stimuli, and for him mental acts are in the line of organic reactions, 
"only not merely vital but so developed as to allow the emergence of 
mind. ttl 
The process of knowing is thus described again in biological 
fashion: "The man reacts to the object which excites him, and that in 
and through this practical response the object is revealed to him as 
being there . rt2 The act of enjoyment is , extending the physiological 
description, alw~s i 4entical with the brain process and its connections . 
It is even suggested that the correct pqysiological description would 
serve in place of the enjqyment , just as the frequency of vibration 
serves in place of the pitch of a tone . 3 Alexander holds his biologi-
cal description of the knowing process to be in contrast with the ex-
treme view of behaviourism, according to which t he psychologist has no 
use for consciousness .4 In the extrema form of behaviourism, psychology 
is concerned only w:i. th bodily reactions , though less outspoken fonns of 
behaviourist psychology admit a mental process . Alexander denotes his 
position with respect to the less extreme view favoured by some behaviour-
ists in these words: 
1 . 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Between such behaviourism and the view taken here 1 there 
is only the difference that consciousness is here regarded 
not as a bare addendum which may be neglected, but as part 
of the real fact , as sound is of a certain kind of vibration. 
This is not to deny that somatic responses are important, 
S. T.D. I , P• xv. 
S .T.D. I , P• xvi . 
S. T.D. I , P • xix . 
S. T.D. I , P• xix. 
and ii may even be the most important data for the ps,ycholo-
gist . 
Alexander' s approach to tm problem of knowledge is based on his 
empirico-realistic method: 
The most striking classification of finite things is into 
minds on the one side and external things on the other. 
The relation between any member of the one group and those 
of the other is the relation of cognition or, in general, 
of experience . Mind knows or experiences; external things 
are known or experienced. 2 
Tne cognitive relation is not considered to be an unique one, and minds 
are treated only "as the most gifted members known to us in a democracy 
of things . 113 The empirical method imposes upon the problem of lmowledge 
the attitude of realism, that is , an attitude which allows to other exis-
tences than mind an equally real place in the scheme of being. 4 
16 
Any experience can be analysed into two distinct elements and their 
relation to one another - the act of mind or the "i.ng" element and the 
object experienced or the 11ed" element . The relation between them is that 
they are together or compresent . 5 Another way of stating this, as already 
noted, is that the "mind enjoys itself and contemplates its object. " These 
two elements are "united in an experience are an act of~ and the appear-
ance of a thing . 116 Here Alexander lays down that the object is always 
"a distinct existence from the mind which contemplates it, and in that sense 
independent of the mind."7 Also, he stipulates that the mind is never a 
1. S. T. D. I , P• xx. 6. S . T. D. I , P • 13 . 
2. S. T .D. I; p . 5. 7. S . T. D. I, P• JS . 
3· S .T. D. I, P • 6. 
4 . S. T. D. I, P • 1. 
5. S. T . D. I , P • 11. 
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contemplated object to itself. l 
The knowledge relation being a togetherness or compresence, is 
described as an empirical experience as follows: "Thus the mind in en-
joying itself enjoys its togetherness with the horse .n2 The act of con-
templation thus becomes an experience of the fact of togetherness with the 
object experienced. The conclusion on the nature of the cognitive rela-
tion drawn in the introduction is that "our togetherness with our object 
and the togetherness of two objects are so far forth as togetherness is 
concerned identical. 113 In the case of peysical objects both te:rms are 
physical. In the case of cognition of a physical object, one of the terms 
is a mental or conscious being. 
After the introductory chapter Alexander examines in Books I and II 
the various categorical features of existence , and later, in Book III takes 
up the study of the various types of existents and their relationship to one 
another, and here the subject of the mind and the cognitive relation is taken 
up again. Some of the main postulates which precede the examination of the 
cognitive relation may be briefly stated. Firstly, mental acts are identi-
fied with neural processes , and hence the mental process is to be looked 
upon as a vital one with the proviso that not all vital processes are men-
ta1.4 Secondly, Alexander states his 11 formuJ.att for Space- Time thus: 
Time as a whole and in its parts bears to Space as a whole 
and its corresponding parts a relation analogous to the 
relation of mind to its equivalent bodily or nervous basis; 
or ••• that Time is the mind of Space and Space the body of Time .5 
1. S.T.D. I, P• 19. 4. S. T.D. II, P• 7. 
2. S.T.D. I , P• 21. 5 . S.T.D. II, P• 38 . 
3. S.T.D. I , P• 26 . 
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Thirdly, qualities are seen to be the special form which the mind element 
assumes on each successive level of existence . l 
Empirical problems, as treated in Chapter III, Book III arise out 
of the relation of what is strictly empirical(eg . qualities) , to the non-
empirical(eg . categori.a.l) • The first and simplest of these relations is 
that all finites are merely connected together within the one Space-Time. 2 
When one of the finites is a mind, and the other of lower level, the can-
presence{or connection) is the relation of cognition.3 Whenever a mental 
process exists in compresence with some existence of a lower order, it is 
aware of that existent which is its object . The relation of cognition is 
thus not a unique relation, but "an instance of the simplest a.nd most uni-
versal of all relations . "4 
The object contemplated, unlike the enjoyment (the mental process) 
is some existent which is non-mental. Also the compresent object does 
not always evoke the mental act by a causal action. In the case ofimages 
and memory, the object compresent may be absent from the senses, but it 
would nevertheless be "correlated with and adapted to so:rr.e non-rr,entcU 
object , which has the characters of sensible experience~5 The real point 
is that 11 from our side, all our objects, sensible or imaginary, claim to 
be real . 116 Also, since the object is distinct from the enjoying mind, 
the mind can never be an object to itself. 1 Again, not only are finites 
1. S.T. D. II, P• 39. 6. Ibid. 
2. S.T.D. II, P• 75 . 7. Ibid., P• 89 . 
3. S.T.D. II , P• 75 . 
L. S.T.D. II, P• 82 . 
5 . S. T.D. II, P• 85 . 
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compresent with each other, but they are related to each other selectively; 
that is, "the objects of which the mind is conscious are partial revelations 
to the mind of things. nl 
Alexander's epistemology is based among other things on the clearly 
demarcated distinction such as was made by G. E. Moore in his paper on the 
"Refutation of Idealism", between the 'object' or "that in which one pre-
swneable thing differs from another, and 'consciousness 1 or that which all 
have in common. n 2 Though the dualism implicit in an epistemology based on 
such a distinction is apparent, there are, however, features in Alexander's 
treatment whereby the dualism tends to be mitigated, often to such an ex-
tent that he has been classified as an epistemic monist by some scholars; 
eg. by Ledger Wood3 and A. H. Kau£fman. 4 Without prejudice to Alexander's 
epistemic posi tian, which he himself does not classify as monistic or 
otherwise, some of the features of the treaznt which lend themselves to 
a monistic interpretation may be brie~ reviewed: 
Firstly, as pointed out by Ledger Wood, Alexander identifies the 
content and the object of lmowledge in that he considers all sense quali-
ties as inherent in the object contemplated by the mind. Empirical things 
with their distinctive qualities are but groupings within the same basic 
stuff of Space-Time, or complexes of pure events or motions in various 
degrees of complexity. 5 
1 . S. T. D. II, P• 91. 
2. G. E. Moore, "The Refutati.cn of Idealism", ~~ N. s . 13(1903), p . 446. 
3. L. Wood, "Recent Epistemological Schools," A History of Philosophical 
Systems, ed. V. Ferm, P• 523 . 
4. A. H. Kauffman, Elan Vital, Nisus, and Creativity 
(Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Boston Universi1Qr, 1954), p . 192. 
5. S. T. D. II, P• 45. 
Secondly, enjqyment and contemplation are not ~~ separate acts , 
tnt contemplation is a name for the same act as enjoyment, only in refer-
ence to the object. l Several other passages support and bear out this 
identity,; such as, "the contemplation of a contEmplated object, is of 
course, the enjoyment which is together with that object or is aware of 
it"2, and again, "the mind enjqys itself only as there is an object con-
templated, which contemplation is the very act of enjoyment. n3 
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Thirdly, in his formula for Space- Time, Alexander describes Time as 
the mind of Space and Space as the body of Time, and thts formula, as he 
himself states, presupposes lower grades of existence of mind. 4 
Fourthly, after an examination of perspectives and sections of 
Space- Time, Alexander cones to the conclusion that the perspective of 
Space- Time from the point of view of both the place and the time of a 
point- instant shows not a "perspective at all but the ~ole of Space-Time. n5 
Here, the possibility of the mind, at a higher level of awareness, contem-
plating the universe as its object cannot be ruled out. In such a situa-
tion the possibility would exist of the mind becoming completely aware, 
not on:cy of the universe, but also of itself as a part of the universe. 
This is almost a return, by the analytical method to the Delphic concep-
tion of knowledge being latent in the mind, capable of being brought for-
ward by recollection. 
1. S. T. D. I , P• xi.v. 
2. S. T. D. I, P• 12. 
3. S. T. D. II, P• l.l6. 
4 . s . T. :n. II, P• 39. 
5. S. T. D. I , P• 76. 
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The relation of togetherness of finite existents becomes hardly dis-
tinguishable1 under such consideratians1 from the relation of identit,y1 and 
Alexa.rxier himself indicates how the continui t,y of Space-Time could bring 
this about in the case of intuition of space and time: 
In being conscious of its own space and time1 the mind is 
conscious of the space and time of external things and vice-
versa. This is a direct consequence of the continuity ~ 
Space- Time in virtue of which any point instant is comected 
sooner or later 1 direc~ or indirectJ.y, with every other. 
That relation was described more explicitly by the cypothesis 
that the instant performed to the point the office of mind1 
and that in an extended sense of ' awareness 1 each point (to 
confine ourselves to space) might be said to be aware of every 
other in the w~ in which minds are aware of one another. l 
ii. Bergson 
For Bergson the theory of koowledge is inseparable from the theory 
of life: 
A theory of life that is not accompanied by a criticism of 
knowledge is obliged tc accept 1 as they stand, the concepts 
which the understanding :t:nts at its disposal: it can but en-
close the facts , willing or not, in pre-existing frames which 
it regards as ultimate . It thus obtains a symbolism which is 
convenient, perhaps even necessary to positive science, but 
not a direct vision of i ts object. 2 
The intellect needs to be stndied in the context of the evolution of life 
in order to teach us how the frames of knowledge have been constructed. 
The problems of philosopey, according to Bergson, can be solved by the two 
inquiries 1 theory of knowledge and theory of life pooled in a cormnon enter-
prise. They would succeed then in sb::ndng the formation of the intellect1 
"and thereby the genesis of that matter of which our intellect traces the 
general configuration. n3 
1. S. T. D. II , P• 144. 
2. C. E., P• xxiii. 
3. C.E. , P• xxiv. 
Ber gson' s theory of knowledge takes into account a clear demarca-
tion or distinction between the two faculties, intellect and intuition. 
The distinction itself is stated thus : "Intelligence and instinct are 
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turned in opposite directions, the former toward inert matter, the latter 
toward life. nl By intuition is ~ant "instinct that bas become disinter-
ested, self- conscious, capable of refiecting upon its object and of enlarg-
ing it indefinitely. "? Intuition may enable us to grasp where intellect 
tails, and thereby supplement it. Though intm. tion transcends intelligence, 
it is from intelligence that it has reached the point it occupies; for with-
out intelligence it would have remained as instinct, and thus closely riveted 
to the special object of its practical interest. 
If intelligence is charged with matter, and instinct with life, we 
must examine them both for their respective roles and contril::ution. We 
have already seen J:x>w this line of argument leads Bergson on to the empiri-
cal stuey of evolution. 3 It i s oncy by "dwelling on the opposition of the 
two elements and on this identi v of origin"4 that Bergson believes that 
we shall bring out clearly the IIW3aning of evolution itself. 
Elsewhere, Bergson conpares his own theory of lalowledge with that of 
Kant, for whom intelligence is "bathed in an atmosphere of spatiality. "$ 
Bergson find Kant definitive in his peremptory refutation of empiricist 
theories of knowledge. He does not, however, accede to Kant ' s denial of 
acy knowl edge of the ' things in themselves • : a It the unknowable reality pro-
1. C. E., P• 194. 
2. ~· 
3. Supra, P• 10. 
4. C.E. P• 196. 
'· 
C.E. , P• 223. 
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jects into our perceptive faculty a "sensuous manifold" capable of fitting 
into it exactly, is it not by" that very fact, in part known?nl The alter-
native put f orward by Bergson, which he thinks did not occur to Kant is 
stated as follows : 
This alternative consists, first of all, in regarding the 
intellect as a special function of the mind, essentially 
turned toward inert matter; then in sa;ying that neither 
does matter determine the fo:nn of the intellect, nor does 
the intellect impose its form on matter, nor have matter 
and intellect been regulated in regard to one another by 
we know not what pre- sstablished harmcny, but that intel-
lect and matter have progressively adapted themselves ~ne 
to the other in order to attain at last a coiTDUon form. 
From this point of view the knowledge of matter given by perception on one 
hand, and science on the other hand, appear as approximative, but not as 
relative. Though posittve science bears on reality itself, its domain is 
inert matter, and it cannot overstep the limits of its own doma.in. 3 
The theory of knowledge for Bergson thus becomes "an infinitely 
difficult enterprise" which exceeds the powers of the intellect alone : 
It is not enough to determine, by careful analysis, the cate-
gories of thought; we must engender them. As regards space, 
we must, by an effort of mind sui generis , follow the pro-
gression or rather the regression Of the extraspatial degrad-
ing itself into spatiality. When we make ourselves self-
conscious in the highest possible degree and then let ourselves 
fall back little by little, we get the feeling of extension: 
we have an extension of the self into recollections that are 
fixed and external to one another, in plpce of the tension it 
possessed as an indivisible active wi11. 4 
By means of illustration by the order of mathematics, and verses of 
poetry, Bergson draws the canparison that will enable us to understand bow 
1. C.E., P• 224. 
2. C. E., P• 22.$. 
3. C. E., P• 226. 
4. C. E., P• 227. 
the suppression or inversion of positive reality can create both extension 
in space and the admirable order which mathematics discovers in it: 
Tbe infinite complexity of the parts and their perfect 
co-ordination among tmmsel.ves are created at one and the 
same time by an inversion which is~ at bottom, an interrupti<n1 
that is to say, a dimunition of positive reality.l 
Continuing, and as a result of a discussion of physical laws and 
general, Bergson concludes that the real can pass from tension to exten-
sion and from freedom to mechanical necessity by way of inversion. 2 The 
inversion is of the principle of what he calls consciousness. In order 
that our own consciousness may apprehend the consciousness that is reality 1 
the requirement is as follows: 
In order that our consciousness shall coincide with something 
of its principle, it must detach itself from the already-made 
and attach itself to the bei$-made. It needs that, turning 
back on itself and twisting on itself, the faculty of seeing 
should be made to be one ri th the act of willinS -- a pa.i.nf'ul 
effort which we can make suddenly, doing violence to our na-
ture, but cannot sustain more than a few IOOments. 3 
Intuition and dialectic are both necessary to get to the principle of all 
life, as also of all materiality. The whole process from being to the 
apprehension of reality is sWll'lla.rized as follows: "'Wmn we put back our being 
into our will, and our will itself into too impulsion it prolongs, we under-
stand, we !eel, that reality is a perpetual growth, a creation pursued with-
out end. "4 
The final chapter of Creative Evolution is devoted to the discussion 
of the knowledge of reality fran the problem of being and becoming. The 
1. c.E., P• 230. 
2. c.E., P• 258. 
3. c.E., P• 259. 
4. C. E., P• 261. 
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is connected either with consciousness or with something that resembles it. nl 
The course of evolution is described as the projection of conscious-
ness into matter, which has led to its bifurcation into two separate lines 
of development, intuition and intellect: 
Lii'e, that is to say consciousness launched into matter., 
fixed its attention either on its own lll)Venent or on the 
matter it was passing through; and it has thus been tumed 
either in the direction of intuition or in that of intellect. 2 
On the side of intuition, consciousness through restriction shrinks into 
instinct. On the side of intelligence, consciousness seems to externalize 
itself in relation to itself. In doing so it adapts itself, and thereby 
opens to itself an unlimited field: "Once freed, moreover., it can turn in-
wards on itself, and awaken the potentialities of intuition which still 
slumber within it. "3 Thus for Bergson, not only does consciousness appear 
as the motive principle of evolution, but among conscious beings, man comes 
to occupy a privileged place.!• 
The main point of similarity to note between the treatment of Bergson 
and that of Alexander is that in Alexander's theory of emergence, Time, as a 
form of consciousness or as the mind of space is also assigned a special 
function in evolution: 
Time and Space, either of them, creates differences in the 
other or breaks it up. But in a special sense Time is the 
author of finitude, for it is the transition intrinsic to 
time which in the first place makes motion possible, ani 
secondly provides for the ceaseless re-arrangements in Space 
1. C.E., P• 196. 
2. C.E., P• 199. 
3. C.E. , P• 200. 
4. ~· 
through which groupings of motions are possible. Time could 
not do its work ldthout Space; but, this being presumed, Time 
is the principle of motion and ohange. l 
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Not only is Time or consciousness the principle of change, but reality for 
Alexander is also imrued with the quality of life. The passage following 
bears a striking resemblance between the two conceptions of reality, con-
sciousness, and life: 
For though matter has no life, it has sanething which plays 
in it the part which life plays in the living organism and 
mind plczy-s in the person; and even on the lowest level of 
existence, any motion has its soul, which is tine . Thus 
matter is not merel y dead as if there was nothing in it akin 
to life. It is only dead in that it is not alive as organisms 
are. Compare rna tter with Space- Time; there is as much reason 
for assuming an entity or entelechy 'materiality' distinct from 
motions which are the behaviour of matter as to assume an enti-
ty ' life ' or ' mind ' distinct from the basis of life in matter. 
Always under the caveat that Time and materiality and life ani 
mind are empirically not tm sallle and not merely different 
degrees of one and the same thing, we are compelled to the 
conclusion that all finite existence is alive, or in a cer-
tain sense animated. 2 
An important point of difference between Bergson and Alexamar is 
that for Alexander, knowledge is a chapter in his metaphysics , and not like 
for Bergson, one with the problem of metaphysics. Alexander speaks in his 
preface, of his method as a "piece of plodding analysis" . This 'WOUld tend 
to lean his metaphysics large~ in tm direction of the intellect. In his 
discussion of plzy"sical Space- Time, however, Alexander admits to a dif.fi-
culty in considering Space and Time in abstraction fran bodies and events, 
and to the fact that we have no sense organ for Space or Time. Here Alexan-
der makes the distinction, that though it is only by analytic attention that 
we can think of them for themselves, the mode of the apprehension of Space 
1. S. T. D. II, P• 48. 
2. S. T. D. II, P• 67. 
or Time is intui tion. l 
Later, in Book Ill, Alexander writes on the ways of apprehending 
categories and qualities& 
We have first to ask how the mind apprehends Space and Time 
and with them the categorical features of things. The appre-
hension of the primar,y qualities offers no particular problem 
when once we know how Space and Time are apprehended, and in 
fact we only immediately apprehend Space-Time and its funda-
mental characters the categories in their empirical determi-
nations. To apprehend Space-Time as such, ana as a ~ole, 
and the categories as such, we have to add reflect:i. on to our 
immediate apprehension. 2 
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The mind does not apprehend the space of objects, or time{space would in-
clude shape, size, locality) , by sensation, but by a form of apprehension 
simpler than sensation: 
We contemplate Space- Time and Space and Time intuitively 
and we enjoy it intuitively. Intuition corresponds to 
that "bastard kind of reasoning" whereby according to 
the speaker in the Timaeus the soul appreheoos Space, the 
matrix of things . Only I repudiate the depreciatory ad-
jective "bastard" . Intuition is different from reason, 
but reason and sense alike are outgrowths from it, empiri-
cal detenninat:i.ons of it. They are its legitimate children, 
And as a father may learn from his child, reason l11BiY clarify 
the intuition. 3 
Alexander associates intuition with f!Very sensory act: "Every 
sensory act contains in 1 tself, and consequently conceals or masks, a sim-
pler act of intuition. 114 Similarly, we enjoy the categorical characters 
of mind, and of external objects . 5 The primary qualities of matter which 
are empirical determinations of Space ani Time and motion, are also appre-
1. S. T. D. I, P• 37. 
2. S.T. D. II, P• 144. 
3. S.T. D. II, P• 147 . 
4. S. T. D. II, P• 148. 
5. S. T. D. II, P• 151. 
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hended by intuition. l In Alexander's scheme, we have cognition of Space-
Time and the primary qualities by intuition, of matter by the 8ense of 
resistance, of secondary quail ties by the special senses, of life by the 
organic and kinaesthetic senses, of other minds by sympathetic imagination 
and assurance. 2 The part played by intuition in the ways of apprehending 
is an important one: 
But though the order in time of the senses does not 
necessarily agree with the order in time of their sensa, 
categoria l cognition, or intuition, precedes all sensa-
tion, not as an isolated f onn of apprehension, but in 
the sense that it is contained in sensation and masked 
by it. 3 
Though the word intuition may not be used in exactly the same connotation 
or implication by both philoso!ilers, it would appear that for Alexander, 
as well as for Bergson, the mode of apprehension of the ultimate reality 
is by intuition. 
The use of the terms intuition and analysis or intellect is of impor-
tance in the systems of both Alexamer and Bergson, as it has important 
bearings on the use of the wrd 1 empirical• as a philosopllical method, and 
also on the problem of lmowledge. Both Alexanier and Bergson profess ad-
herence to the empirical method, and yet include within their respective 
empiricisms discussion of the a-priori or non- empirical elements in a man-
ner which appears on first sight to be confusing and contradictory. Alex-
ander1 s statement that "philosophy may be described as the experiential or 
empirical study of the nan-empirical or a- priori," strikes one as being a 
self- contradictory statement. However, a careful study and perusal of the 
1. S. T.D. II, P• 158. 
2. s. T.D. II, P• 176. 
3. S. T.D. II , P• 178. 
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development of the argument reveals not so much of a contradiction, as of 
a certain fiexibility in the use of the word 'empirical' itself. This 
would hold equally true for Bergson as for .Alexander. 
For Alexander, the word empirical is held to be equivalent to experi-
ential, and as has already been seen, our knowledge, whether of the empirical, 
or of the non-empirical or categorial alike, are held to be parts of the 
experienced world.l Now when these qualifications are read in conjunction 
with the fact that Alexanier does not claim by the use of the term empiri-
cal, a prerogative for sense experience, then only is it possible to arrive 
at a proper appraisal of the use of the tem ' empirical• by him. 
The gist of the bearing which such an use of the term empirical has 
on Alexander ' s epistemology is contained in the statement that the m:>de of 
apprehension for Space-Time is by intuition, but that it is "only by analytic 
attention that we can think of them for themselves. n2 Elsewhere it is stated 
that to "apprehend Space-Time as such, and as a whole, and the categories as 
such, we have to add refl ection to our immediate apprehension. "3 The immedi-
ate or intuitive apprehension of Space- Time can be best umerstood by Alex-
ander's doctrine of the identity of the acts of enjoyment and contemplation: 
In being conscious of its own space and time, the mind is 
conscious of the space and time of external things and 
vice versa. This is a direct consequence of the continu-
ity of Space- Time in virtue of which any point is connected 
sooner or later, directly or indirectly, with every other. 4 
The subsequent use of reflection or ~sis provides, for Alexander, our 
1 . Supra, P• 4. 
2. S. T.D. I , P• 37. 
3. S. T.D. I , P• 144. 
4. Ibid. 
-
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knowledge of Space-Time as such, "and as a whole". Thus, in Alexander 1 s 
epistemology, the intuitive apprehension of Space-Time, and the process of 
analysis or reflection both play their parts as essential elements, whose 
combined roles provide knowledge of the nature of reality. 
With Bergson we find yet another slant on the use of the word empiri-
cal. Though like Alexander, Bergson• a method is also empirical, the primary 
difference lies in the latter• s dualistic use of experience, similar to the 
distinction whi.ch he draws between science and philosophy, intellect and 
intuition, the inert, and the living. l For Bergson, science and the intel-
lect can only deal with matter, and it is philosophy, which by the faculty 
of intuition, must investigate into the domain of the living. As a result, 
and without detriment to tm use of the method which goes as empirical, 
apparently science, theory of knowledge, and metapeysics find themselves 
on the same ground. 2 Knowledge of reality is reached by the combined and 
progressive development of science and philosophy, that is, by a combina-
tion of intellect and intuition. While for Alexander distinction is made 
between intuitive apprehension and analysis or renection, Bergson distin-
guishes between the matter of our knowledge, which is supplied by intuition, 
and its form which is supplied by intelligence.4 Both Alexan:ier and Bergson, 
therefore, tend to include the intuitive apprehension of reality within the 
.embrace of the empirical method in philosophy, with the distinction, that 
while Bergson admits to a dualism in his concept of experience, Alexander 
admits to no such dualism. In addition to intuition provision is made for 
1. Supra, p. 13a. 
2. C. E., P• 217. 
3. C.E., P• 164. 
the role of intelligence or intellect in Bergson 1 s systan and analytic 
attention or reflection in .Alexander's systan to complete the process of 
!mowing. 
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It may be noted that while the comept of the empirical nethod as 
used by .Alexander and Bergson appears to vary from the traditional use or 
connotation attached to the word empirical, that is, restricted to sense 
experience, it is in no-wise at variance with twentieth centur.r trems in 
science. The empirical method of modern p~sics is a far cr.y from the methods 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and nor are the measurements 
of modern p~sics based on the 'sensible' dimensions of mass, length and 
time as of old. The present day physical observations may well be of the 
nature of recordi~s of deflections or oscillations of a Cathode rq, and 
the computation of the results of such observations often entail a long 
process of mathematical calculations involving not only intelligence, and 
renection but the free use of concepts in the mind. Einstein describes 
best the method of modern p~sics in these words: "Physical concepts are 
free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely 
deter.mined b.Y the external world."l The empiricism of modern physics, like 
the empiricism of Alexander and Bergson, thus renects a widening and an 
I 
elaboration of the traditional usage and connotation associated with the 
word empirical, and is in hannony with the trends of development of methods 
used by modern science. 
l . Einstein and Infeld, The Evolution of Phfsics, p. 33. 
CHAPTER III 
THE NATURE OF REALITY 
1 . Reality as Space-Time 
In his Introduction to §Pace, Time and Deity, Alexander arrives at 
the conclusion that "Space and Time may be in sons peculiar fashion basic 
to all being . nl The six chapters of Book I are devoted to a consideration 
of the nature and properties of Space- Time . The discussion is carried 
through under three main heads or aspects, namely, Physical Space-Time 1 
Mental Space- Time and Mathematical Space- Time. The conclusion of the six 
chapters through which the discussion lasts is as follows: 
We may sum up this long inquiry in the brief statement 
that whether in physics , in psychology, or in mathematics, 
we are dealing in different degrees of directness with one 
and the same Space and Time; and that these two, Space and 
Time, are in reality one : that they are the same reality 
considered under different attributes. What is contem-
plated as physical Space- Time is enja,yed as mental space-
time. And however much the more generalised mathematics 
~ seem to take us awa¥ from this empirical Space- Time, 
its neutral world is filled with the characters of ~ce­
Time, which for its own purposes it does not discuss. 2 
Ph;ysical Space and 'fime are presented in ordinary experience by 
what are commonly known as extension and duration. In order to examine 
empirically what Space and Time are, it is necessary to consider them by 
themselves, in abstraction from bodies and events which occupy thEIIl . There 
being no sense organ for Space or Time, they are apprehended, according to 
Alexander by intuition, and it is only by analytic attention that we can 
think of them for themselves . This leads to two alternative beliefs; firstly, 
1. s . T.D. I , P• 30. 
2. S. T. D. I , P• 180. 
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that space and time are properties of sensible things, and secondly, that 
they consist of relations between things or entities. The hypothesis put 
forward by Alexander is that 
Space and Time are not merely the order of their coexistence 
and succession, but are, as it were, the stuff or matrix(or 
matrices) out of which things or events are made, the medium 
in wbi ch they are precipitated and crystallised; that the 
finites are in some sense complexes of space and time. l 
The empirical characters of Space and Time as presented through 
physical extension and duration, are their continuity and infinitude. We 
also arrive at the idea of a point or instant in a wq which is the reverse 
of that by which we construct an infinite Space or Time, that is, by an act 
of a.nalytl.cal imagination. By using the idea of the point or instant we do 
not falsify the character of Space or Time, but "dis sect it into its ele-
ments, following the plan of its construction.n2 
The next feature of Space-Time which becomes apparent on renection 
is that they are interdependent, so that there is neither space without 
time nor time without space, and here the remarks of Alexander are signi-
ficant: 
The roost important require100nt for this analysis is to 
realise vividly the nature of Time as empirically given 
as a succession within duraticn. We are, as it were, to 
think ourselves into Time. I call this taking Time ser-
iously. Our guides of the seventeenth century desert us 
here. Besides the infinite, tw things entranced their 
inteljects. One was Space or extension; the other was 
lllild. 
The philosophers of the seventeenth century failed, in the opinion of 
Alexander , to appreciate the importance of Time, and he cites Bergson as the 
l. S. T.D. I , P• 38 . 
2. S. T.D. I , P• 41. 
3. S. T. D.,I , P• 44. 
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first philosopher iJl our da;y to take Time seriously. 
Physical Time is not only a continuous duration, but it is also a 
succession from earlier to later. The temporal and successive character 
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of time points to the necessity for some continuum other than Time which 
can secure and sustain the togetherness of past and present, of earlier 
and later. If there were no such continuum, and Time existed in complete 
independence, there would be no continuity in it, and Time would consist 
of nothing more than perishing instants. Space supplies the second ele-
ment in the continuum needed to save Time from being a mere 1now• . l Again, 
if Time cannot be wha.t it is without indissoluble relation to Space, nei-
ther can space be except through indissoluble connection with Time. The 
entity required to save Space from becoming a blank is Time. 2 It would 
thus appear that without Space there would be no connection in Time, and 
without Time there would be no points to cormect, and each of the two, 
Space and Time , is vital to the existence of the other: 
It follows that there is no instant of time without a 
position in space and no point of space without an in-
stant of time, I shall sq that a point occurs at an 
instant and tha.t an instant occupies a point. There 
are no such things as points or instants by themselves. 
There are only point-instants or pure events. In like 
manner there is no mere Space or mere Time but only 
Space- Time or Time- Space ••• The real existence is 
Space-Time, the continuum of point- instants or pure 
events. 3 
A further analysis of the still more intimate relation of Space 
and Time reveals that corresponding to the three dimensions of Space, are 
three features of Time, namely its bei~ successive, irreversible, and uni-
1. S. T. D. I, P• 46 . 
2. S.T. D. I, P• 47. 
3. S.T.D. I, P• 48. 
form in duration, and that the various feat\ll'es of the one depend for their 
character on those of the other. l The empirical characters of Space and 
Time thus reveal that "the mutual relation of Time and Space is so close and 
ramified that they cannot be considered as separate entities but only" as the 
same entity described in terms of its different elements. n2 Such a conclu-
oion is not different from the notion of a world in Space and Time as for-
mulated by mathematical ITEthods by Minkowski. 3 
For Alexander , the reality of Space and Time can be compared to the 
Platonic "substance" which contains the identity and the diversity in one. 4 
Space can be regarded as generated in Tinle1 or by Time--for Time is 
the source of movement. Space, then can be imaged as the trail of Time . 5 
Space-Time can also be considered as lines of advance connected into a whole 
or system, that is, a system of motions. Space-Time may be called by the 
name of Motion. 6 
The implications of the properties of Space-Time are worked out in 
an interesting chapter entitled 'Perspectives and Sections of Physi cal 
Space- Time', which opens with a striking passage: 
The physical universe is thus through and through historical, 
the scene of motion. Since t~re is no Space without Time, 
there is no such thing as empty ~ce or empty Time and there 
is no resting or immoveable Space. 7 
Now Space and Time may be empty of qualities or things, but since Space is 
a 
full of Time and Time is full of Space, each of them is/complete continuum; 
1 . S. T. D. I , P• 57 . 6 . Ibi.d. 
2 . S. T. D. I , P• 58. 7. S. T. D. I , P• 65. 
3. Ibid. 
4. s . T. D. I, P• 61. 
'· 
s . T. D. I , P• 61. 
37 
or in other words, Space- Time is a plenum. Material bodies can nx>ve in the 
absolute plenum of Space- Time, and their motion implies that the time-
coefficients of their spatial outlines change. l 
The whole of Space- Time , as an infinite continuum of pure events or 
point instants lends itself to being viewvd in perspectives or sections. 
To a point- instant in respect of its time, the perspective is one of "the 
whole of Space, not occurring at one instant but filled with times of vari-
ous dates. n2 The perspective from tm point of view of a point of space 
from an instant, we have "the lihole of Time· occupying not the same point 
but points of space at all manner of distances from the central point of 
reference. n3 Thus, the perspective from an instant gives a picture of 
Space; a perspective from a point gives a picture of Tiroe. The perspec-
ti ve of Space•Time from the po:int of view of both the place and time of the 
point-instant is "not a perspective at all, but the whole of Space- Time. n4 
The perspectives of the universe viewed from points or instants leads 
again, to the condition of the very nature of Space- Time that each instant 
was repeated in space and each point in time 1 or in other words that neither 
Space nor Time exists apart from the other: 
1 . 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
In other words , the reality of Space- Time may be resolved 
into the elements total Space and total Time, provided 
olicy it be remembered that in their combination Space is 
al~ variously occupied by Time and Time spread various-
ly over Space • .? 
S.T.D. I , P• 65. 
s.T.D. I , P• 69. 
s.T.D. I , P• 15. 
s.T.n. I , P• 76. 
S.T.D. I, P• 83. 
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This, according to Alexander, accounts for the impropriety of distinguishing 
total Space as conceptual fran empirical space as perceptual. 
By mental time Alexander means the time which the mind enjoys; so al-
so by" mental space he means the space, assuming it to exist, which the mind 
enjoys. As a result of his analysis Alexander finds that m3ntal space and 
time possess the same characters and are related in the same intimacy of 
relation as physical Space and Time. That is, "the time of mental events is 
spatial and their space temporal precisely as with physical Space and Time; 
and further that mental time, the time in which the mind lives its life or 
minds its mind, is a piece of time in which physical events occur; and 
similarly of mental space. "l The mind as the experienced continuum of men-
tal acts, is a time series, or "has Time in its very consti tution.n2 Like 
Bergson, it is described as a "theatre of movement or transition, motion 
without end.n3 The Time in which we enjoy our mind is part of the same 
Time in which external events occur. In the case of direct apprehension of 
an external object, the enjoyed and contemplated existents are compresent in 
a time-relation which unites both terms within the one Time: 
Now without doubt, when I rEI!lember that a friend called at 
llzy' house an hour ago, I mean that that event occurred an 
hour before rrr:t present condition of rqself in the act of 
remembering that event, and that the mental ~ the peysi-
cal event are apprehended within the one Time. 
Similarly, our mental space and our contemplated space belong "experi-
entia.lly to one Space, which is in part contEmplated, in part enjoyed. "5 A 
1. s . T. D. I, P• 93. 
2. S. T. D. I, P• 94. 
3. S. T. D. I , P• 95. 
4. Ibid. 
5. s . T. D. I, P• 98. 
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discussion of the correlation of mental and physiological processes within 
the central nervous system leads to the conclusion that; "1-find and body are 
e.xperientiall.y one thing, mt two altogether separate things, because they 
occupy the same extension and places as a part of the boqy. nl 
Alexander's treatment of the relation between the time of the mental 
process, or the enjoyed date, to the time of the physiological process which 
corresponds to it is based on the analysis of the act of remembering. For 
him, the object of memory though compresent in the mental act, is itself a 
past object: 
The truth is that remembering and expecting do occur at the 
present moment; but we are not entitled, therefore, to de-
clare their objects simultaneous with the present. To be 
apprehended as a memory in the act of remembering simultan-
eously with an act of present perception is nat to be apprehended 
as simultaneous with the ' present ' object. 2 
Further analysis of mental space- time, and of the act of e:xpectation of the 
future leads Alexander to the conclusion that we have mental space repeated 
in time, which is the fact of memory, and that there is repetition of time 
in spacea 
We have tlms found fran simple inspe ctioJt of our minds, 
and bringing to bear on t he question the most conunonplace 
kind of ps.ychological observation, that space and time in 
mind are in experienced fact related in the same way as we 
have seen them to be related in physical Space and Time. 
Space and Time in the mind are indissolubly one . 3 
As regards mathematical space and time, Alexander's answer is that 
1. S. T.D. I, P• 107. 
2. S. T.D. I, P• 117. 
3. S. T. D. I, P• 139. 
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directly or indirecUy mathematics is concerned •rl. th empirical Space and 
Time, however remote tmy may seem to be from tmir origi.nal .1 In this 
view, the conception of a mathematical point is not that of a self-subsistent 
entity but as a first approximation "which is corrected by the notion of its 
continuity with o~r points . n2 Continuity is explained by tl::e function of 
time, for points are instants as well. 3 Thus, for Alexander, the Mathemati-
cal notion of continuity as applied to Space or Time carries with it the 
corrective to the apparent isolation of points and instants: 
For the point is never really at rest but only a transition in 
a motion. Now it is this restlessness of the point which is 
expressed in terms of Space itself by the criteria of continuity 
which the mathematician adopts in order to free hi~ points 
from their apparent isolation and self-dependence. 
Geometry treats Space conceptually by omitting Time from it. The differ-
ence rere, would like not in the nature of empirical an1 georootrical space, 
but only in the treatment of Space , which for the metaphysician remains the 
one and the same . 
The conclusion drawn at the end of Book I is therefore that Space and 
Time, whether considered as physical Space and Time, extension and duration, 
or mental space- time, or as the order of relations which mathematics investi-
gates, are in the end all one . 5 
Alexander's treatment of the categories derives from his conception 
of Space-Time, and its elements as being represented conceptually as point-
instants or bare events. Einpirical things or existents becane 11 groupings 
1. S.T.D. I, P• 144. 
2. S. T. D. I, P• 146. 
3. S. T. D. I , P• 148. 
4. Ibid. 
5 . S. T.D. I, P• 180. 
of such events, whirlpools within that ocean, or they are crystals in that 
matrix.nl As to the character of empirical existents Alexander makes a 
clear distinction between those which are variable and those which are per-
vasive . Among variable characters or qualities are listed life, colour, 
taste, consciousness; these vary fran thing to thing and may be called empiri-
cal characters . Pervasive characters belong in some fonn to all existents. 
Examples are, identity, substance, diversity, magnitude, number: 
Moreover, not only are these characters of what we commonly 
call things, but they are characters of all existents what-
ever, that is to say of everything, where the word thing is 
equivalent to any finite object of experience. 2 
The pervasive characters of existents are, for Alexander the categories of 
experience, the categorical characters as distinct from empirical ones or 
qualities. A stipulation made at this p~int, however, is that categorical 
characters are also experienced, and so in the w:ider sense of the term, 
empirical. 3 
Thus, the categories are for Alexander, the groundwork of all empiri-
cal reality, "the prerogative characters of things which run through all the 
rest as the warp on which the others are woven. n4 The primary qualities are 
the variations of the categorical ones in empirical circumstance. They are 
also connnon to mind and to non-mental things. As categories are fundamental 
properties or determinations of Space- Time itself, Alexander disallows the 
imputation of categories b,y the mind to its objects.5 
1 . S. T. D. I, P• 183. 
2. S. T. D. I , P• 185. 
3. ~-
4. s.T. D. I, P• 186. 
5. S. T. D. I, P• 188. 
As a result of his treatment of categories, Alexander arrives at his 
definition of being: 
One thing is diverse from another in so far as it occupies a 
different point-instant from another thing or 100re genera.l.ly 
a different portion of space- time. The occupation of any 
space- time, that is , self identity, in distinction from a:rr;y 
other space-time is existence or determinate being. l 
Identity, diversity, and existence arise out of the nature of any space- time, 
as being part of total Space- Time, and therefore co~cted with other space-
times . Being is the "occupation of space- time which also excludes other occu-
pancy of space- time. 11 2 Existence or being can be resolved into its two ele-
menta of identity and difference, 
because a point-instant or group of them is in the first place 
what it is , and in the next place is not a mere isolated point 
of space or instant of time, but is saturated with Time or Space 
respectively, and driven thereby out of its isolation into rela-
tion with point-instants other than itself . 3 
Alexander is at one with Bergson in viewing not-being as "sane world which 
has being, that is, within Space- Time, but of a different kind. n4 
At a later stage, all existent s , being complexes of space-time are 
declared to be substances: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
For simplicity and brevity it will be enough to speak of 
substance as a piece of Space which is the scene of suc-
cession without stating the same thing in terms of Time, 
in the reverse order. Any existent is a substance in 
this account of the matter. Even a simple 100tion in a 
straight line is an extrane instance of the life of a sub-
stance, though the motion be not repeated and the substance 
endures or remain identical only for the duration of the 
single motion • .5 
S. T. D. I , P• 194. 
S. T. D. I , P• 195. 
S. T. D. I , P• 197. 
s . T. D. I , P• 199. 
S.T. D. I, P• 270. 
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A thing or complex substance is described as a contour of space 
within which take place the motions correlated to the qualities of the 
thing; the complex substance being the "persistence in time of this spa-
tial contour with its defining IOOtions. nl The mind is suggested as the 
most easily understood example of a substance. 
2 . Reality as Duration. 
The example which Bergson gives in order to illustrate his concep-
ti.on of the nature of reality is one which we can seize from within, by 
intuition: "It is our own personality in its flowing through time - our 
self which endures. "2 The failure of the intellect to apprehem the nature 
of reality through the use of symbols has already been studied in the pre-
vious chapter. The definition of reality which he gives in his An Intro-
duction to J.fataphysics is as follows : 
This reality is mobili-cy. Not things made, but things in 
the making, not self- maintaining states, but only changing 
states exist. Rest is never mre than apparent, or, rather 
relative. The consciousness we have of our own self in its 
continual nux introduces us to the interior of a reality, 
on the model of which we JIIUSt represent our realities ••• 
All reality, therefore, is tendency, if we agree to mean 
by tendency an in~pient change of di.rection. 3 
Else1-rhere he describes reality in clearly Dzy"sti.cal language: 11 some ilmnobile 
substratum of that which is moving, as some intemporal essence of time; it 
is this that I shall call eternity; an eternity of death, since it is no th:i.mlg 
else than the movem:mt emptied of the mobility which made its life. u4 
1 . S. T. D. I , P• 270. 
2. A. I . T. M. , P• 24. 
3. ~., P• 49. 
4. ~., P• 47. 
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In Creative Evolution, the concept of duration is tackled from various 
standpoints in different chapters, and in Chapter I the main emphasis is on 
Time, from the standpoint of evolution: 
For our duration is not merely one instant replacing anotherJ 
if it were, there would never be anything but the present -
no prolonging of the past into the actual, no evolution, no 
concrete duration. Duration is the continuous progress of 
the past 'Which gnaws into the future and which swells as it 
advances. ! 
Proceeding to a consideration of material objects, or "unorganized bodies", 
Bergson finds that succession in time is an undeniable fact even in the 
material world, and the operation by which science isolates and closes a 
system though not altogether artificial represents only a tendency of matter 
to constitute isolable systems. Yet this is a tendency only, and the uni-
verse endures: 
The more we study the nature of tire, the more we shall com-
prehend that duration means invention, the creation of fonns, 
the continual elaboration of the absolutely new. The systems 
marked of by science endure only because they are bound up 
inseparably with the rest of the universe. 2 
Thus, according to Bergson, there is no reason why a duration in time, and 
a form of existence like our own should not be attributed to systems that 
science isolates. 
This emphasis on time leads to Bergson 1 s refutation of the mechanical 
explanation of evolution which is in essence an attempt to regard "the future 
and the past as calculable functions of the present, and thus to claim that 
all is given. "3 Such a doctrine for Bergson, deprives Time of its efficacy 
1. C.E. , P• 7. 
2. C. E., P• 14. 
3. C.E., P• 43. 
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and mistakes the apparent for the totality of the real. The application of 
the principle of finality to evolution similarly leads to the conclusion 
that "all is given" and thus agrees with radical mechanism in doing away 
with time and neglects the real nature of duration: 
Real duration is that duration which gnaws on things and leaves 
on them the mark of its tooth. If everything is in ti~m, every-
thing changes inwardly, and the same concrete reality never re-
curs. l 
The thesis put forward by Bergson in Chapter III of Creative Evolu-
tion is that the genesis of both intellect and material bodies can be traced 
back to a wider and higher form of existence, which according to him may be 
called consciousness, and which nru..st be "coextensive with universal life . n2 
The import of this thesis on his epistemology has already been studied in 
the previous chapter, and it entails the approach to reality by the canbined 
and progressive development of science and of philosophy. The description 
of reality which such u approach leads to is as follows: 
Let us seek, in the depths of our experience, the point where 
we feel ourselves nx>st i lltillately within our own life. It is 
into pure duration that we then plunge back, a duration in 
which the past, always moving on, is swelling unceasingly with 
a present that is absolutely new. But, at the same tine, we 
feel the spring of our will strained to its utmost limit. 3 
Here, in addition to life and consciousness, another term has been introduced 
into the description of reality or duration, namely, will. 
Behind "spiri tuali W" on one hand, and 11ma teriali tyn on the other hand 
are two processes in opposite directions, am we may pass from spirit to mat-
1 . C. E., P• 52 • 
.1!: 2 . C • • , P• 204. 
) . C. E., P• 219. 
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ter by inversion, or interruption. l The formation of pure space is the 
lirni t at which this movement ends - "in short, in conferring on matter the 
properties of pure space, we are tran5!X'rting ourselves to the tenninal 
point of the mov~nt of which matter simply indicates the direction?"2 
Spatiality, like materiality in Bergson ' s scheme is a result of the pro-
cess of inversion or interruption of the reality which is of the nature 
of consciousness. The role of metaphysics in this view is to build up 
progressively a cosmology which would be a reversed psychology: "All 
that which seems positive to the physicist and to the geometrician would 
become, from this :new point of view, an interruption or inversion of the 
true positivity, which would have to be defined in psychological terms . n3 
Similarly, the order or mechanism of nature is ascribed to the in-
version of the will elell13nt of reality, by inversion of which it is possi-
ble to pass fran tension to extension a:rxi from freedom to mechanical neces-
sity. 4 The general picture drawn of the inversion of reality and the gene-
sis of matter is as follows : 
Extension, we said, appears on]y as a tension which is inter-
rupted. Or, are we considering the concrete reality that fills 
this extension? The order which reigns there, and which is 
manifested by the laws of nature, is an order which must be 
born of itself when the inverse order is suppressed; a deten-
tion of the will would produce precisely this suppression. 
Lastly, we find that the direction which this reality takes, 
suggests to us the idea of a thing unmaking itself; such, no 
doubt, is one of the essential characters of materi.ali ty •••• 
The vision we have of the material world is that of a weight 
1. C. E. , P• 220. 
2. C. E., P• 223 . 
3. C. E., P• 228 . 
4. C. E., P• 258. 
which falls: no image draw from matter, properly so called, 
will ever give us the idea of the weight rising. l 
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Life, on this a.nalysis is an effort to "remount the incline that matter 
descends."2 - that is, an effort to raise the weight which raJ.Js . It is 
a tendency to accumulate in a reservoir something that would have otherwise 
flowed awq. 
Another analogy given is that of steam escaping in a jet: 
Let us imagine a vessel full of steam at a high pressure and 
here and there in its sides a crack through which the steam 
is escaping in a jet. The steam thrown into the air is near-
ly all condensed into little drops ldti.ch fall back, and this 
condensation and this fall represent simply the loss of some-
thing, an interruption, a deficit. But a small part of the 
jet of steam subsists, uncondensed, for some seconds; it is 
making an effort to raise the drops which are falling; it 
succeeds at most in retarding their fall. So, from an immense 
reservoir of life, jets must be gushing out unceasing:cy, of 
which each, falling back, is a world. The evolution of living 
species within this world represents what subsists of the primi-
tive direction of the original jet, and of an impulsion which 
continues itself in a direction the inverse of materiality. 3 
The points of difference between the conception of Space-Time as 
basic- stuff and Bergson' s duration have been brought out clearly at several 
points by Alexander himself. Duration, for Bergson, is the prolongation of 
the past into the actual and the present. "In reality, the past is preser-
ved by itself automatically. In its entirety, probably, it follows us at 
every instant.n4 And again, nEvolution implies a real persistence of the 
past in the present, a duration which is, as it were, a lJn>hen, a connecting 
link."5 Space, which is occupied by matter does not, for Bergson, hold the 
l . c.E., P• 267. 
2. c.E., P• 268. 
3. c.E., P• 270. 
4. c.E., P• 7. 
5. c.E., P• 27. 
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same status as Time, which he does not spa.tialize. 
On the discussion of memory, Alexander stresses the point that the 
act of memory is the enjoyment of the past, and thus has "not the mark of 
the present but the past." According to Alexander, Bergson has failed to 
make tbe distinction between the act of remembering, "of appropriation of 
the past, which is really present, from the memembered past itseJ.f. nl 
The treatment of Alexander equates the Space-Times of Psychology, 
Physics and mathematics; that is, mental, physical, and mathematical Space-
Times. According to the cosmology of Bergson, which is, in his tem.s, a 
reversed psychology, the reality which the physici. st or mathematician deals 
with, is an interruption or inversion of true positivity, and hence cannot 
be of the same status as psychological space- time . 
While the contention of Alexander is that Time is laid out in Space 
and is intrinsically spatial(just as space is temporal) , for Bergson the 
spatialization of 'l'ime would be depriving it of its real character. The 
difference arises, according to Alexander, out of Bergson's asswmption that 
the space of the geometer is abstract space, devoid of tine . According to 
Alexander, however, the space of the mathematician is not abstract or devoid 
of Time. 2 Such is tbe misapprehension which, according to Alexander, re-
flects on Bergson 1 s conception of the relation of Time to Space, and of 
Space to Matter: 
No one has rendered such service to metaphysics as he has 
done in maintaining the claims of Time to be considered an 
ultimate reality. Moreover, space is for him generated 
along with Time. The movement of Time, the swing and im-
pulse of the world, the xelan vital, is also a creation of 
1. S. T.D. I , P• 142. 
2. s . T. D. I , P• 149. 
matter ••• Wlth Mr. Bergson, on the other hand, Space is a sort 
of shadow or foil to Time, and not co-equal. It implies de-
gradation and unreality, relatively to Time. Time remains the 
unique and ultimate reality. We have seen reason to regard 
them as so implicated in each other that each is vital to the 
other1 s existence.l 
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Finally, in his treatment of the categories, Bergson differs from .Alex-
anier in that they are not for him the pervasive characters of things. The 
idea of reality as one of unceasing change and creation of new forms, does 
not in Bergson 1 s view fit in, with fixed or static coneeptions of categories, 
such as are supplied by the reason or the intellect. 2 The history of philo-
sophical systems shows us 11 the impossibility of satisfactxrily getting the 
real into the reaqy- made garments of our reaqy-made concepts, the necessity 
of making to measure.n3 According to Bergson it is the instinctive or in-
tuitional kn~fledge which provides the mind with categorical propositions. 
Such a conclusion is derived from the discussion of the difference between 
instinct and intelligence, which is expressed in the formula: 11 Intelligence, 
in so far as it is innate, is the knowledge of a form; instinct implies the 
knowledge of a matter. n4 Of these two different and divergent modes of 
knowing, the first gets at definite objects immediately in their materiality. 
The second gets at no object in particular, but is oncy a natural power of 
relating an object to an object: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
In short, the first kind of' knowledge, the instinctive, would 
be formulated in what philosophers call Categorical propositions, 
while the second kind, the intellectual, would alwqs be express-
ed hypOthetically. Of these two faculties, the former seems, at 
S. T. D. I, P• 150. 
C. E., P• 55. 
~· 
C. E., P• 164. 
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first, much preferable to the other. l 
Such an interpretation of the categories, while at variance with Alexander ' s 
concept of them as fundamental properties of Space- Time seems to be in con-
formity with Kant ' s treatment of the categories as universal and necessar.y 
creative activities of the mind. Bergson's categories, unlike Alexander ' s 
do not lend themselves to a systematic treatment as do the categorical or 
pervasive features of empirical existence. The basic point for Bergson is 
contained in the statement that "the intellect is characterized by a natural 
ina bill ty to comprehend life . " 2 Instinct, thus , proceeds organically, and 
would "give up to us the most intimate secrets of life . 113 Instinct is also 
closely bound up with instinctive action: "The JOOst essential of the primary 
instincts are really, therefore, vital processes .n4 The type of instinctive 
or intuitive knowledge on which Bergson lays the greatest emphasis is that 
of Time in its aspect of Duration. He also roontims the "spring of our will" 
as being associated with the intuition of pure duration. 5 Time is thus raised 
to an all important status as a category, but it would appear that space and 
matter, being apprehensible by the intellect, would not be treated as cate-
gories by Bergson. Along with Im-ation, life takes an important place in 
conceptual categories in Bergson' s schene : "Life, we have said, trans cents 
finality as it transcends the other categories. n6 Like Kant, Bergson also 
distinguishes between the matter of our knowledge and its fonn. The matter 
is what is given by the perceptive faculties and the fonn is the totality of 
1. c.E., P• 165. 5. c.E., P• 219. 
2. c.E., P• 182. 6. c.E., P• 289. 
3. c.E., P• 182. 
4. •9•E•I P• 182. 
the relations set up between these materials in order to constitute a sys-
tematic knowledge. l So according to Bergson, instinct is prior to experience 
and provides the categories into which our experience comes to be inserted. 2 
The Kantian distinction is between the llform" and the "content" of knowledge, 
and for Kant it is the intuition of space, time and the categories which sup-
plies the form of knowledge, whereas sensation or empirical experience pro-
vides the content • 
3. The Historical Perspective 
i . Alexander• s naturalistic background. 
It is said that in Alexander's system it has been 11asserted for the 
first time in the hi story of philosophy that 1 space- time ' is the stuff of 
which the world is made, the matrix out of which the universe has evolved. 113 
As he belongs to the naturalistic tradition, it mq be worthwhile to review 
briefly and in perspective, a few of the major conceptions of the world stuff 
that have prevailed in the history of naturalistic thought . Detailed compari-
sons are not possible, and will not be attempted. 
According to Vergilius Ferro, naturalism is a type of philosophy which 
cuts across the historical stream of Western thought, but it can claim no 
long course of consecutive development. 4 Modern naturalism has taken on a 
wider meaning than that of materialism and positivism, and :takes cognizance 
1. C.E., P• 164. 
2. Ibid. 
3. P. s . Naidu, "Evolutionism," History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, 
ed. s. Radhakrishnan et a1. , P• 362. 
4. V. Fenn, "The Varieties of Naturalism," A History of Philosophical 
Systems, ed. v. Ferm, P• 429 . 
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•f realms of experience such as values, purposes, and ideals, which reach 
out beyond quantitative and mechanical measurements. Fenn defines the 
naturalistic position as follows: 
Nature is the sum and substance of all that is and to know 
Nature is to come to terms with it in the JOOst promising wq, 
i . e ., by social and tested experience, by scientific methods, 
b,y reflections based on such experience and methods ••• 
Naturalism, in other words, is based on a One World of dis-
course and rests upon a method of arriving at knowledge and 
philosophic vision which can be said to be basically empirical. l 
In the opinion of Ferm, the first naturalists in the historic stream 
of Western thought were the Ionians of ancient Greece, who inspite of their 
failures or inconsistencies, lay the beginnings of a new approach through 
their method of inquiry: 
The Ionians were not materialists (so called b,y some 
historians); they were dynami.s ts (or more strict:cy, 
hylozoists) since they interpreted nature to be alive 
with forces within, of one kind or another. 2 
Cornford distinguishes three elements in the 'ph,ysis 1 discussed by the 
Ionians, name:Jy; physis as 1) soul, 2) as substance, and 3) as Divine. 3 
Also, the idea of 1physis' is traced back by him to the JeyStery religions 
and even earlier sources: 
Our conclusion was that the representation the.y called pgysis, 
and conceived as the ul.timate living stuff out of which the 
world grew, could be traced back to an age of magic actually 
older than religion itsel£.4 
The atomism of Democritus and others gave naturalism a materialistic 
turn and is considered to be the earliest formulation of the materialistic 
1. ~., P• 430. 
2. Ibid., P• 431. 
3. F. M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1957), P• i27ff. 
4. Ibid., P• 124. 
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tradition. The dualism implicit in the two-world views of Plato and Aris-
totle entered Greek thought "by cultural ani ideological infiltration and 
set its indelible mark through popular religions(e. g. Orphism) into the big 
philosophies of Western culture . nl In the opinion of Ferm, though Aristotle 
attempted to effect a compromise between the two worlds he did not completely 
extricate his philosophy from dualism. The logos theologies of early Chris-
tian thinkers were also attempts to "bring the broken metaphysical world 
together and dull the edge of traditional dualism. n2 
The naturalism of Spinoza, ~th its concept of universal substance 
(cosmic neutralism) occupies a high place in historical naturalism. The 
term substance as used by Sptnoza is meant to describe the underlying reality 
of the universe and not the constituent material of anything. Used in con-
junction with the terms •attribute ' and 'mode', it indicates t he inner being 
or essence as against any particular fom or mode which the r eality assUIOOs. 
Spinoza further identifies substance with nature and God. 
Among the modern versions of naturalism named by Ferm may be mentioned: 
the revisionary naturalism of Herbert Spencer; the graded level-systems of 
Alexander and R. w. Sellars; the naturalistic materialism of Santa-yana; the 
animistic materialism of W. P. Montague; the pragmatism of William James; and 
the system of Bertrand Russell who is described as a contemporary P,ythagorean. 3 
ii. Bergson' s drift to vitalism. 
The leading representatives of Vitalistic philosophy are named by 
Arthur Berndtson as Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson, with anticipa-
1 . Ferm, A. H. O. P. S., P• 432. 
2 . Ibid. , P• ~33. 
3. ~., P• 437. 
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tions of their doctrines in Schopenhauer. Resemblances to Vitalism in re-
cent times are to be found in American pragmatism, i n A.i. Whitehead, and 
in Existentialism. ! 
Philosophies of Evolution are undoubte~ the result of the influ-
cnce of biology on philosophers of the nineteenth century. In this connection 
it is noteworthy that among the ancient systems, Aristotle, who was a biolo-
gist came close to evolutionism in his concept of an orderly, progressive 
development of gross matter into pure fonn through graded intervening 
stages. 2 Vitalism thus reflects both the biological and the evolutionary 
influences in its philosophical outlook. 
Schopenhauer ' s philosophy has been described as a reaction against 
rationalism and its anti thesis. 3 In The World as Will and Idea he describes 
the nature of will and its relation to idea. The phenomenal world is des-
cribed as the mirror of the will, its objectivity, and will is described as 
the thing-in-itself, the irmer content, the essence of the world. On the 
views put forward by Schopenhauer, S. K. Maitra writes: 
In the first place, we gather that the will is the noumenon 
or the thing-in- itself, and bhe idea its phenomenon. Second-
ly, we learn that this noumenon or thing-d.n-itself i.s without 
knowledge, and is merely a "blind incessant impulse11 • It ap-
pears therefore that according to him, a blind incessant im-
pulse without consciousness is the pri.mordlial reality and 
that it objectifies itself in life and consciousness. Such 
a reality is hardly distinguishable from physical force, and 
this view, therefore, which looks upon life and consciousness 
as evolving out o! such a reality, can hardly be distinguished 
from materialism. 4 
1 . A. Berndtson, nvitalismn, A. H. e . P. s ., P• 375. 
2. Radhakrishnan, et. al . ed. History of Philosophz, P• 354. 
3. ~., P• 287. 
4. Ibid. , P• 288. 
In the opinion of w. A. Kaufmann, Nietzsche ' s position is best 
elucidated by comparing it, not with Schopenhauer ' s, but with Hegel's, 
and he finds an amazing parallel in the use of the word aufheben by Hegel 
and Sublimieren by Nietzsche. Both words mean a simultaneous preserving, 
canceling, and lifting up: 
This entire exposition could, of course, be repeated for 
Hegel ' s conception of aufheben; only Hegel ' s basic force 
is not the will to power but spirit - - not mind - - and its 
aim, freedom rather than power. Further, it may seem that 
Hegel ' s auf he ben is a conceptual process while Nietzsche ' s 
sublimation is a psychological notion. That there is a 
significant difference here can hardly be doubted; but 
aufheben is not only conceptual and sublimation not only 
psyCho!ogical. Neither Hegel ' s spirit nor Nietzsche ' s 
will to power can be restricted in such fashion: each is 
conceived as, above all, the essence of the cosmos . Auf-
heben and sublimation are coextensi. ve with these basic 
principles and thus essential~ cosmic processes. l 
4 . The Problem of Becoming 
' Alexander s treatment of the problem of becoming derives fran his 
concept of the categories as fundamental properties or determinations of 
Space- Time itself, "not taken as a whole , but in every portion of it. n2 
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The categories are "begotten by Time on Space. 113 They are, in other words, 
expressions of the nature of Space- Time itself. Another important factor 
is that categories enter as "constituent characters in to every existent, 
whatever its quality. n4 
Being or existence is the occupation of any space- time in distinction 
1 . W. A. Kaufmann, Nietzsche : Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 
(Princeton: P. U. Press, 19SO) , P• 207. 
2. S. T. D. I 1 P• 189. 
3. Ibid. 
4 . S. T. D., I, P• 193. 
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from any other space- time. l In the reali~ of Space- Time, each point of 
space is determined and distinguished by its instant in time, and each 
instant of time by its position in space . Identity and diversity thus 
arise out of the respective roles of Space or Time on each other: "The 
elements of the one reality which is Space- Time, and not either Space or 
Time alone, owe their distinctness in either kind to the complenentary 
element. n2 Hence the conclusion that "the reality of Space and Time is in 
Platonic phrase the 1 substance' which contains the identi. ~ and the diver-
si. ty in one. n3 
Another way of explaining identity, diversity and existence is that 
they arise out of the continuity of Space-Time: 
Identity, diversity and existence arise out of the intrinsic 
nature of Space- Time as a continuum of its parts which are 
space- times, or rather it arises out of the nature of any 
space- time, as being a part of Spp.ce- Time and therefore 
connected with other space- times.4 
Any point- instant or group of them, is therefore intrinsically itself, and 
other than some other point- instant or group, and "existence is distinct 
from identity only in this reference or relation to the other. 115 This re-
lates identi~ and existence with the category of relation. 
Being in this trea"t.JTent is equated with determinate being or existence, 
and Alexander repudiates the concept of Not- Being: "There are no beings 
(occupants of space- times) which are not existents. n6 If we try to think 
l . S. T. D. I , P• 194. 5. Ibid. 
2. s. T.D. I , P• 60. 6. S. T.D. I, P• 199. 
3. S. T. D. I , P• 61. 
4. S. T. D. I , P• 195. 
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of not-being as if it were something disparate from being, we are, according 
to Al.exand.er, surrepti ti.ously thinking of some world which has being, that 
is, is within Space-Time, but of a different kind.l In a sense, however, all 
determination is negation, 11for all definite occupation of space- time is 
other than other than other such occupation and excludes it."2 There is, 
for Alexander, no category of being other than that of determinate being 
or existence. 
The denial of being less than deteminate being leads to Alexander's 
rejection of the Hegelian concept of Becoming as the synthesis of Being and 
Not-Being. How, Alexander asks, can bare abstract thoughts or abstractions, 
be combined to produce a concrete one? 
Had becoming, which is in fact motion or Space-Time in its 
simplest conceptual form, been anacysed into being and 
not- being as different and mutually involved ele~nts 
with becoming, becorri.ng would have been equivalent to what 
we have called existence, f~r the existent is nothing but 
motion( that is Space-Time) . 
Here, becoming is identified as motion or Space-Time in its simplest con-
ceptual form. Thus, Space-Time for Alexander is Being, endowed through 
its intrinsic motion, with its own principle of becoming. 
The same kind of treatment applies to all the categories . The cate-
gory of relation follows from the continuity of Space-Time, and all existents 
are in relation because events, or groups of them are connected within 
Space-Time. Qualities are assumed to be correlated with certain motions, 
and in the course of Time, a substance may change its characters, "but 
l . S. T.D. I, P• 199. 
2. s . T. D. I, P• 200. 
3. s . T.D. I , P• 204. 
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always within the limits set by the law of its construction. nl Causality 
is the relation of continuity between two different motions, "the motion 
which precedes that into which it is continued in the order of time being 
the cause and the other the effect.n2 Substance and cause are almost iden-
tical: "But a substance is a system of motions and whether the cause is a 
substance or a motion is all one . A cause is the motion of a substance, or 
a substance in respect of its motion. 113 The important qualification which 
Alexander adds here, is that 11no notion of power or necessity is contained 
in the conception of causality as a category. 114 Stripped of the notion of 
power, the principle of causality becomes nothing roore than the proposition 
that a motion is continuous with some precedent JlX>tion. 
Quality and change are not included in the list of categories by 
Alexander. Quality is an "empirical generalization of the various specific 
qualities of things, or a collective name for them all. 11 5 Change always 
involves empirical elements, it is a transition "from one e~irical deter-
mination to another. n6 Primarily, change is a change of quality, and the 
relation between change, quality and motion is described: 
1 . 
2. 
) . 
4. 
'· 
Remembering that all existents, no matter what qualities 
they possess, are in the end complexes of motion, we may 
describe change as a species of motion which replaces one 
set of motions by another; it is grounded in motion and 
may be described as a motion from one motion to another.? 
Reality for Bergson, as has al.reaey been seen, is a perpetual becoming--
S. T. D. I, P• 270. 6. S. T. D. I, P• 328. 
S. T. D. I, P• 279. 7. S. T. D. I, P• 329. 
S.T. D. I, P• 280. 
S. T. D. I, P• 290. 
S. T.D. I, P• 326. 
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as revealed by intuition -- a making and an unmaking, but never soJOOthing 
made. The intellect, however, preoccupied with the necessities of action, 
"is limited to taking at intervals, views that are instantaneous and by 
that very fact immobile of the becoming of matter."l The inability of the 
intellect to grasp the real nature of reality leads in Bergson 1 s opinion, 
to two theoretical illusions, of which the first "consists in supposing 
that we can think the unstable by means of the stable, the moving by means 
of the immobile . n2 The second illusion is that of importing into specu-
lation the practical procedure for action, which aims at getting what we 
want or lack, or creating something that does not exist -- we express what 
we have as a function of what we want . This illusions is the idea of 
"Nothing. 11 
The analysis of the idea of nothing leads Bergson to the conclusion 
that it is akin to the idea of the All: nit is therefore an idea eminentzy 
comprehensive and full, as full and comprehensive as the idea of £!, to 
which it is very closely akin.n3 It is the idea of Nothing which leads to 
the illusion that "reality fills a void, and that Nothing, conceived as an 
absence of everything, pre-exists before all things in right, if not in 
fact . n4 Such an illusion is what Bergson attempts to reroove by his analy-
sis of the concept of Nothing. 
The first illusion (of immobility) arises from the second: 
If we pass(consciouszy or unconsciously) through the idea 
of nought in order to reach that of being, the being to 
1. C. E., P• 297. 
2. C.E., P• 297. 
3. C.E., P• 322. 
which we come is a logical or matematical essence, there -
fore non- temporal . And consequently, a static conception 
of the real is forced upon us : ever.ything appears given 
once for all, in eternity. l 
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The concept of the static, immobile Being is discussed by Bergson right 
through the history of philosophical thought from Zeno of Elea to Spencer. 
The basis or standpoint from which the discussion is carried out is the 
thesis : "What is real is the continual change of form: form is only a snap-
::;hot view of a transition. "2 The conclusion drawn after the survey of 
historical systems is : 
The philosopher must go further than the scientist. Making 
a clean sweep of everything that is onJy an imaginative 
symbol, he will see the material world melt back into a 
simple flux, a continuity of flowing, a becoming. Ani he 
will thus be prepared to discover real duration there 
where it is still more useful to find it, in the realm 
of life and of consciousness . 3 
On comparison of the positions of Alexander and Bergson it would 
appear at once that both are agreed on one aspect of the problem at least 
on the question of Not-being, and on this point of agreement Alexander com-
ments: 
The nothing we can think of and experience is not nothing 
at all but is an object of some kind and is a department 
of being. These are ancient considerations, derived from 
Plato 1 s Sophistes . They have been revived in our day to 
much purpose by Mr.4Bergson in an admirable passage of the Creative Evolution. 
On the question of Being, while Bergson repudiates the notion altogether as 
an illusion, Alexander posits determinate being or existence as one of the 
1. c. E., P• 324. 
2. c.E., P• 328. 
3 . c.E., P• 401. 
4. S. T. D. I, P• 199. 
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basic categories. Alexander ' s determinate being or eristence is also pure 
motion, and in this wa:y, is not far removed from Bergson' s duration which 
is a continual flux or becoming. In fact, Alexander himself equates becoM-
ing with "motion or Space- Time in its simplest conceptual form. nl There is 
considerable similarity in the views of both the philosophers on the dynamic 
nature of reality: 
In a language which is alMost Heracli tean, Alexander exalts 
pure movement to the status of the essence of the world, 
and speaks of change as the universal characteristic of all 
things that have evolved out of the primal matrix. No 
&reater tribute to the validity of the Bergsonian concept 
of duration could be paid than the admission that universal 
flux is the essence of existence. And this single consider-
ation is enough to reveal to us the fact that the concept 
of eMergence is incomplete in itself am that it must move 
on to be completed by "creative evolution. n2 
It ma:y be noted that the concept of Being and Becoming of both Bergson 
and Alexander is at variance from that of the religious tradition, where both 
a positive or Being aspect, and a negative or Non- being aspect are simultan-
eously attributed to the Divine . Stace writes of the relation of the posi-
tive and negative aspects of the Divine : 
It is part of the positive divine to affirm activity of 
God, the creative activity which results in the existence 
of the world, as well as those activities which are in-
volved in guiding and controlling the world and in the 
loving care of His children. This is the dynamic concep-
tion of God. But it is an essential part of the negative 
divine that God is wholly inactive. This appears as the 
concept of His ' unchangeableness '. This conflicts with 
the dynamic conception, yet both the dynamic and the 
passive are equal~ necessar,y elements in the religious 
consciousness. The one correspqnds to the Being, the 
other to the Non-Being, of God. J 
1 . S. T. D. I , P• 2~. 
2. Rad.hakrishnan, et al ed. History of Philosophy, p . 364. 
3. W. T. Stace, Time and Eternity (Princeton: P. U. Press, 1952) , P• 59. 
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It would appear, that from the stampoint of the religious tradition, the 
emphasis in the systems of both Alexa.IXier and Bergson is on the eyruwic or 
the Being aspect of the Divine, and both deny the negative or the Non-being 
aspect of the Divine. It has been one of the problems of the philosophical 
tradi tiona that build their systems on the religious heritage to relate the 
Being of God which is described as perfect, eternal and changeless to the 
being of the phenomenal world, God' s creation, with its nature of imperfec-
tion, transitoriness, and mutability. Though different systems have attempt-
ad to offer solutions of the problem in different w:zy-s, the problem remains 
one of the difficult and seemingly insoluble ones, both for religion and 
for philosoplzy'. 
As a general reflection on the two views of the nature of reality, 
one fact which would seem to emerge as noteworthy is the status given to 
the phenomenal world with reference to the nature of metaphysical reality. 
The basic ili.fference of approach in this respect hinges upon the fact that 
Alexander's system has for its ideal the naturalistic One World of discourse, 
whereas Bergson 1 s metaphysics is dualisticall.y tinged, and hinges upon the 
distinction and dualism between the inert and the living, the int.el.lect and 
intuition, matter and supra-physical reality. For this reason, the physical 
or phenomenal world in Alexander's system does not suffer from any degrada-
tion from the nature of reality as does Bergson's. Space-Time as the basic 
stuff, and its pervasive features or categories penneates through the entire 
universe as the warp on which all existences are woven. Space and Time are 
inter-dependent, and one does not exist without the other, whether we treat 
reality at the mental level, at the physical level, or at the abstract level 
of mathematical speculation. Such is not the case with Bergson 1 s scheme of 
things, where it is the psychological aspect o£ r eality as consciousness 
which receives a primary position, while tl:e world of physics and mathe-
matics, of matter and space, are said to be a degradation from or inver-
sion of the true reality which is supra-physical. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CONCEPT OF EVOLUTION 
1. Evolution as Emergence. 
~t batt been~ in- tAe-pr~ous-cbapter that uali ties of empirical 
existents are correlated in Alexander 1 s scheme with certain motions 1 and in 
the course of Time1 a subs~ce ~ change its Characters within limits set 
by the law of its cmstruction. The basis for the examination of the order 
of empirical qualities that characterise existent things at their respective 
levels is provided by the formula f or Space- Time: that 
Time as a whole and in its parts bears to Space as a whole 
and its corresponding parts a relation analogous to the 
relation of mind to its equivalent bodily or mrvous basis; 
or to put the matter shortll that Time is the mind of Space 
and Space the body of Time . 
On this basis, qualities are treated as the special form which the mind 
level assumes on each successive level of existence . 2 Thus, a certain 
constellation of vital processes has the quality of consciousness. In all 
finite things, however, there is something of which, on the highest known 
level of finite existence, mind is the counterpart. 3 On the level of Space-
Time, it is Time: 
1 . 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Out of the time-element, as we· shall see, the quality of 
nrl.nd as well as all lower empirical qualities emerge, and 
this qu.ali ty mind belongs to or corresponds to the con-
figuration which is proper to the level of existence on 
which mind is found. 4 
S. T. D. II, P• 38 . 
S. T. D. II, P• 39. 
S. T. D. n , P• 44. 
S. T. D. II, P• 44. 
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' 
In the course of Time, new orders of finites come into existence 
within Space-Time. The first, or elementary condition of Space-Time is 
motion, whi.ch is purely spati.o- temporal. Empirical things or existents, 
with distinctive empirical qualities are complexes of pure events or mo-
tions in various degrees of complexity. The appearance of new orders of 
qualities is described as •emergence ': 
But as in the cdurse of Time new canplexi ty of motions 
comes into existence, a new quality emerges, that is , 
a new complex possesses as a matter of observed empiri-
cal fact a new or emergent quality. l 
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The appearance of the empirical quality of mind or consciousness from the 
level of the vi tal is a case of emergence: 
The emergence of a new quality from aey level of existence 
means that at that level there comes' into being a certain 
constellation or collocation of the motions belonging to 
that level, and possessing the quality appropriate to it, 
and this collocation possesses a new quality distinctive 
of the higher complex.. • the complex collocation which 
has mind, though itself vi tal , is determined by the order 
of its vital co!tfPlexity, and is there~re not merely vital 
but also vital. 2 
Alexander states at this J?Oint that he is in general agreemeni(. on 
this matter with c.L. Morgan, and it mczy- be worthwhile to illustrate the 
concept of emergence in the _ context of its use and application by the latter, 
in hi.s Emergent Evolution, a work published subsequent to Alexander ' s Space, 
Time, and Deity. Evolution, according to Morgan, is the name "we give to 
the comprehensive plan of sequence in all natural events. 113 The orderl,y se-
quence of events when viewed in perspective reveals the appearance, from time 
1. S. T. D. II, P• 45. 
2. s . T.D. II, P• 46 . 
3. C. L. Morgan, Emergent Evolution (London: Williams and Norgate, 1923), P• 1 . 
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to time, of something genuinely new, and it is to this feature that the 
concept of emergence applies: 
Under what I call emergent evolution stress is laid on this 
incoming of the new. Salient examples are afforded in the 
advent of life, in the advent of mind, and in the advent of 
reflective thought. But in the peysical world emergence is 
no l ess exemplified in the advent of each new kind of atom, 
and of each new kind of molecule. l 
Morgan cites the concept of emergence as having been dealt with by 
J.s. Mill in his ;<>gic, and as contrasted with "resultant", being suggested 
by G. H. Lewes in his Problems of Life and Mind. 2 Distinction is made, both 
by Lewes and Morgan, between the 11resultant11 as denoting the "quantitative 
continuity which underlies new constitutive steps in eroorgence" , and emer-
gence, which denotes " qualitative change of direction, or critical turning 
point, in the course of events. "3 According to Lewes, the nature of emer-
gent characters can onlY be learnt by experience of their occurrence, and 
hence are unpredictable before the event. Another noteworthy feature about 
the concept of emergence is that it is not a mechanistic interpretation: 
The essential feature of a mechanical- or, if it be pre-
ferred, a mechanistic interpretation is that it is in 
terms of resultant effects only, calculable by algebraic 
sumrnation ••• Against such a mechanical interpretation --
such a mechanical dogma--emergent evolution rises in 
protest. The gist of its contention is that such an 
interpretation is quite inadequat~ . Resultants there 
are; but there is emergence also. 4 
The position of Morgan with regard to the problem of evolution is that 
"in the acknowledgement of God an ultimate philosophical explanation, 
1 . Morgan, Emer~ent Evolution2 P• 1. 
2 . ~., P• 3 . 
s. Ibid., P• 5. 
4. ~., P• B. 
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supplementary to scientific interpretation, is to be found. l 
Returning to the treatment of Alexander, we have t:r.e following ac-
r 
count of the emergence of a new quality: 
Material things have certain motions of their own wbi ch 
carry the quality of materials. In the presence of light 
they are endolved rrith the secondary quality of colour. 
Physical and chemical processes of a certain complexity 
have the quality of life ••• The higher quality emerges 
from the lower level of existence and has its roots there-
in, but it emerges therefrom, and it does not belong to 
that lower level, but constitutes its possessor a new 
order of existent with its special laws of behaviour. 2 
In the opinion of Alexander, the existence of emergent qualities admits no 
explanation, and is to be accepted with the "natural piety" of the investi-
gator. 3 The mw quality emerges in an existant when it ass~s a certain 
complexity of configuration, and to this pattern or universal corresponds 
the new emergent quality. Following the clue of the mind-body relation, 
quail ty may be said to belong to things or existents as mind or conscious-
ness belongs to the body Wi.ch is a life-process of a certain configuration. L 
Time, in this conception is the generator of qualities because 
Space- Time of its own nature breaks up into finites of different intensities 
and extents . 
But in a special sense Time is the au thor of finitude, for it 
is the transition intrinsic to Time which in the first place 
makes motion possible, and secondly provides for the cease-
less rearrangements_fn space through which groupings of mo-
tions are possible . 
Time is the principle of impenua.nence which is the real creator, and Space-
1 . Ibid. , P• 9. 
2. S. T. D. II, P• 46. 
3 . S. T. D. II, P• 47 . 
4. S. T. D. II, P• 47. 
5. S. T. D. II, P• 48. 
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Time is the stuff which receives detennination in the qualities it assumes 
as its complexity of grouping develops in Time. As stuff, Space-Time pre-
cedes finite things as the recipient of quality in its various empirical or 
finite forms . Space-Time itself, though the stuff of material things, is 
not material itself, it is anterior to such ma.tter. l 
The different levels of existence noted in Alexander ' s system are : 
1) Motions, 2) matter as physical(or mechanical), 3) Matter with secondary 
qualities, 4) life, 5) mind. 2 The primary qualities of things are the 
empirical modes of categorical characters, such as size, shape , number, 
motion of various sorts . The secondary qualities, colour, temperature, 
taste, and the like, a.s belonging to thi~s in themselves lllCzy" be regarded 
as "corresponding to certain disturbances, of whatever ld.nd, in or amongst 
the material particles, which disturban~es are then notified to our senses 
by certain movem3nts of the media, so that we apprehend these qualities. n3 
According to Alexander, the sensible character of what we apprehend in the 
non-mental external object(the sensum or sensible) stands to the movements 
or the primary determinations of the thing, in the relation of consciousness 
to its underlying vital process: " The secondary quality is the mind or soul 
of its corresponding vibration or whatever the primary roovement may be."L 
In this view secondary qualities arise or emerge from JOOveroonts or a certain 
order of complexity, and material movements cannot be separated from the 
secondary quality, any more than physiological processes can be what they 
1 . S. T. D. II, P• 49. 
2. S. T.D. II, P• 52. 
3. S. T.D. II, P• 56. 
4. S. T.D. II, P• 59. 
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are in the absence of their conscious _quality: 
Thus a movement or process or act occurring in a material 
thing if it is of the right sort, is red or sounds or is 
fragrant; such bodily acts have no longer merely categori-
cal and material characters but possess secondary quality. 
The movement which may be thought of as being a complex 
of primary determinations is revealed to sense as a sensum 
with its so- called sense- quality. l 
Thel conception of secondary quality as the mind of its primary substrate 
confers on quality the nature of a continuing activity, and the permanent 
secondary quality of a thing postulates the permanence or continuance of 
such activity. 2 
Life, on this sche112 ~comes an emergent quality taken on by a 
complex of physico-chemical processes belonging to the material level: 
It is thus a certain constel lation or complex or collocation 
of physico- chemical processes which behaves vi tally, and the 
presence of such constellations which makes the structure to 
which they belong an organism. To call it organism is but 
to mark 'the: fact that its behaviour, its response to stinru.-
lation, is, owing to the constellation, of a different charac-
ter from those which physics and. chemistxy are ordinarily 
concerned with, and in this sense wometbing nel'r w:i th an ap-
propriate quality, that of life. 3 
Life is intermediate between matter and mind. It is not an epiphenomenon 
of matter, but an emergent from it. The difference of the material and the 
organic ' machine' lies in the comparative rigidity of the one and the plas-
ticity of the other.!• 
Mind, the last empirical quality of finites that we kmw, is an 
emergent from the level of living existence: 
1. S. T. D. II, P• 59. 
2. S. T. D. II, P• 61. 
/ 
3. S. T. D. II , P• 62. 
4. S. T. D. II, P• 66. 
Each new type of existence when it emerges is expressible 
completely or without residue in terms of the lower stage, 
and therefore indirectJ.y in terms of all lower stages; 
mind in terms of living process, life in terms of peysico-
chemical process, sense quality like colour in tei'Jl'G of 
matter with its roovements , matter itself in tenm of mo-
tion. Moreover, everywhere this result appears '00 be 
secured as it is in our own persons .1 
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There is a soul at each level which has a close connection with the con-
ception of the universal, or the Greek conception of the form. 2 The course 
of evolution, or the ascending order of qualities of finite existence is 
likened to the growth of the soul, the body being a piece of Space- Time, 
the time of which is the soul- con$1. tuent which is identical with the 
body-constituent: 
Beginning with spatio- temporal finites, there is a continual 
ascent to newer and more developed existents, so that the 
course of Time issues in the grorTth of ever new types of 
1 soul I , and in this way all existence is linked in a chain 
of affinity, and there is nothing which does not in virtue 
of its constitution respond to ourselves, who are but the 
highest known illustration of the general plan; so that there 
is nothing dead, or senseless in the universe, Space- Time 
being itself animated. 3 ' 
The ascent of quali~ takes, place, it is assumed, through growth in com-
plexi ty, and the emergent quality is the SUllllll:i.ng together into a new totali-
ty of the component materials. 
As has been stated by Alexander, the concept of emergence is to be 
accepted as an "empirical fact11 with11natural piety" and admits no e:xplana-
tion. Throughout the discussion of the order of empirical qualities no 
attempt is made to account for the reason for the appearance of the ner1 or 
l . S. T. D. II, P• 68 . 
2. S. T. D. II, P• 68. 
3. S. T. D. II, P• 69. 
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emergent qualities at various levels. Even the consideration of the prob-
lem is postponed till the end, and it is not till Alexander comes to Book 
IV -- Deity -- that the subject is opened as a part of the problem of the 
relation between Deity, God, and the Universe. 
Alexander distinguishes two wqs of defining God; first, as the ob-
ject of religious emotion or worship, and secom, the zootaphysical approach 
wherein God is defined as the being if any, which possesses the divine 
quality or deity. Alexamer defines his own approach to the problem in 
these words: 
Abandoning the attempt to define God directly, we mq ask 
ourselves Whether there is place in the world for the 
quality of deity; we may then verify the reality of the 
being which possesses it, that is of the Deity or God; 
and having done so, we may then consult the religious 
consciousness to see whether this being coincides with 
the object of worship . lofuere then, if at all, is deity 
in the scheme of things?l 
Following this procedure, Alexander notes the emergence within 
Space- Time of successive levels of finite existences each w1 th its charac-
teristic empirical quality, leading to the highest known quality of mind. 
Ee then defines deity as "the next higher empirical quality to it.he highest 
we know. n2 At each level of existence it is possible to note a higher em-
pirical quality which stands towards the lower quality as deity stands to-
wards mind. Time as the soul of its Space is the principle of growth and 
internal development of the world, and in the course of time there arise 
finite beings "whose soul is materiality, or coloUB, or life, or in the 
end what is familiar as mind. n3 The developroont of the world, described 
1 . S. T. D. II, P• 345. 
2. Ibid. 
3. S. T. D. II, P• 346. 
in its simplest terms as the redistribution of moments of Time among 
points of Space cannot be regarded as ceasing with the emergence of mind • 
. And here, for the first time Alexanier introduces a new term which is the 
nearest approach to the explanation or cause for the e~irical fact of 
emergence; the term nisus : 
We have to think upon the lire s already traced by experience 
of the emergence of higher qualities, also e~irical. There 
is a nisus in Space-Time which, as it has borne its creatures 
forward through matter and life to mindi will bear them for-
ward to some higher level of existence. 
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By virtue of its nisus, the un:i. verse is engaged in bringing to birth 
the next higher e~irical quality, as a sequel to the levels of qualities 
already having appeared, from the original basic stuff of Space- Time. Deity 
is the next higher empirical quality to mind, but what the quality is we 
cannot know, for we can neither enjqy nor contemplate it. It is on~ possi-
ble to describe it by analogy : 
It is fi t:cy described in this analogical manner as the colour 
of the universe. For colour, as we have seen, is a new ~alit,r 
which emerges in material things in attendance on motions of a 
certain sort. Deity in its turn is a quality which attends 
upon, or more strictly is equivalent to, previous or lower 
existences of the order of mind which itself rests on a still 
lower basis o£ qualities, and emerges when certain complexities 
and refinements o£ arrangement have been reached. 2 
For a.ny level of existence, deity is the next higher empirical 
quality, and even down to material existence, there would be some "unknown" 
quality in front , the real nature of which is enjoyed by the creatures of the 
next level. 3 Alexander confesses to a sense of the ~sterious which the 
notion of the nisus towards a "higher birth" or deity implies. 4 
1 . S. T. D. II, P• 346. 
2. S. T. D. II, P• 347. 
3. S. T. D. II, P• 348. 
4. Ibid. 
As regards the question of the being which possess deity, and its 
relation to God and the universe as Space- Time with its nisus towards 
deity, Alexander defines his position as follows: 
God is the whole world as possessing the quality of deity. 
Of such a being the whole world is the ' body' ani deity is 
the 'mind'. But this possessor of deity is not actual but 
ideal. As an actual existent, God is the infinite world 
with its nisus towards deity, or, to adapt a phrase of 
Leibniz, as big or in travail with deity. l 
The important point to note is that Alexander does mt identity 
God with Space- Time, nor nisus with Time. Trere are subtle distinctions 
in the respective roles in each case . God cannot be Space- Time because 
the latter evokes no religious sentiment, and as such fails to make the 
religious emotion speculati-v;ely intelligible. 2 Thus , on the one hand is 
the totality of the universe which is spatio-temporal; and on the other 
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hand the quality of deity being engendered within the whole through nisus; 
and these two features "are united in the conception of the whole world as 
expressing itself in the character of deity, and it is this and not bare 
Space- Time which for speculation is the ideal conception of God. "3 
(v '/·~ Further discussion of the concept of deity will be taken up later, 
in dealing wl.th the goal of evolution, and for the present it is the role 
of nisus which may be dwelt upon, a little further. Alexander uses correla-
tive tenns to describe the activity of nisus, and A. H. Kauffman distinguishes 
three classes of such terms, namely, objective, metaphirical, and psychological: 
The objective terms appear most infrequently in s . T. D. I I . 
Examples of these would be: "forward moveJOOnt," "process of 
1. S. T. D. II, P• 353. 
2. ~· 
3. S. T. D. II, P• 354. 
realization, n "process towards, 11 "emergence," "process 
towards the emergence of, " etc. (cf. pp. 377, 319, 394, 
413, 42u, 429). Metaphorical terms are oore often used 
with regard to the nisus. The most COITUlX)n 1:\Y'pe of meta-
phor is that which compares nisus to "birth", "pregnancy", 
or "travail." {cf. PP• 347, 353, 354, 378, 427). Other 
figures such as "flowering into," "onward sweep," or 
"onward pressure," and "universal bent" are employed by 
Alexander to convey the neaning of nisus (cf. pp. l.UO, 
417, 381, 418) . The most common ~e of term or phrase 
wich Alexander uses to apply to the nisus may, perhaps, 
be called psychological. Terms employing the idea of 
"tendency" were the most COlll1!X)n of these ( cf. PP• 354, 
361, 364) . Tei"'ll.'3 indicating "straining After," or 
11 straining towards," and 11 endeavour towards" were also 
used. "Striving," "effort," and "impulse," were noted 
in his article "Spinoza and Time," {pp • .380- 382) . 
11Restlessness, 11 "passion, 11 and "feeling" were also used 
in connection with the nisus (cf. pp. 401, U08, 418) . 
Thus, it can be noted that nisus is approached roore 
easily by means of the analogical and metaphorical 
avenues t~ by the more objective or non-figurative 
method. l } 
1t is perhaps a moot point in Alexander• s system, as to whether 
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the naturalistic ideal of a "one World of discourse" is strictly maintained 
by his introduction of the concepts of God., deity and nisus in their care-
fully demarcated roles, as being embraced within the framework of a uni-
verse built out of the basic stuff of Space-Time. c.L. Morgan writes of 
the necessity of reaching for a limiting concept -- "that of ultimate de-
pendence in terms of which the whole course of emergent evolution is explain-
ed (not merely interpreted) within one consistent and balanced scheme. 11 2 
Such an attempt leads Morgan towards the concept of God as directive 
Activity: 
z. 
For better or worse, while I hold that too proper attitude 
of naturalism is strictly agnostic, therewith, I, for me, 
cannot rest content. For getter or worse, I acknowledge 
God as the Nisus through whose Activity emergents emerge, 
A. !l. Kauffman, "Elan Vital, Nisus, and CreativitY'~ B. U. Dissertation, 
1954, P• 195ft. 
Emergent EVolution, P• 33. 
" . 
and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed. l 
-- Morgan criticizes Alexander 1 s position as follows: 
For Mr. Alexander deity no less t han mind is an emergent 
quality. He distinguishes between "deity as a quality 
and God as a being. " Am he says that "God as actuaJJ.y 
possessing deity does not exist but is an ideal, is al-
ways becoming; but God as the whole universe tending 
tot-:ards deity does exist" (Mind, XXX, p. 428} . According 
to the second part of this statement, with its ring of 
Spinoza, God, as being, is the nisus of the universe 
pressing onwards to levels as yet unattained; or, as I 
should prefer to say, is the Nisus directive of the 
course of events. With regard to the first part, the 
crucial question arises whether, and if so in what sense, 
such an ideal is veritably Real. 2 • 
2. Evolution as due to Vital Impetus 
Bergson' s approach to the problem of evolution is based on the 
premise already discussed that the theory of knowledge and theory of 
life are inseparable and should join each other in the empirical study 
of evolution. The plan of treatment followed in his book conforms, as 
it were, to the configurations of his subject. In Chapter I he examines 
\ 
the existing theories of biological evolution with a vieu to testing the 
two main types of evolutionary theories put fort·tard, naiOOly, mechanism 
and finality, and shol.Js that neither of tne~ is entirely satisfactory. 
In Chapter II he traces the evolution of life in the directi. on leading 
to the development of the human intellect. Chapter III is devoted to a 
discussion of the genesis of matter arxi intellect, and Chapter IV to an 
,. 
historical criticism and analysis of various philosophical systems with 
regard to the conception of Being, Non-being, and Becoming. 
l . Ibid. , P• 36. 
-2. ~. , P• 34. 
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In his Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Bergson recapitulates 
"the distinctly empirical character of our conception of the 'vital impetustnl 
under nine points or arguments, which are condensed below as a summary. 
1 . Attempts to resolve the phenomena of life to peysical and chemi-
cal facts can be likened to 18\Ying dmm the rules of a method, but no to 
stating a fact -- for "science is as far as ever from a p:hysico- chemical 
explanation of life. n2 
2. Theories of evolution which maintain that the passage of one 
species to another was accomplished by a series of accidental variations 
tempered by selection and heredity are inadequate . The evolution of life 
occurred in certain definite directions . 
3. It is not the mechanical action of external causes but an "inward 
impulse that passes from germ to germ through individuals, that carries life 
in a given direction, towards an ever higher complexity. n3 
4. The vital impetus operates neither according to mechanism, nor 
according to finalism. "If the marvellous co- ordination of the parts with 
the whole cannot be explained in terms of mechanics, yet it does not demand, 
in our opinion, to be treated as finality.n4 
5. Whereas an outside view of an act tends to decompose it into an 
infinity of co-ordinated parts, and inside view reveals it to be an undivid-
ed act. In evoking the image of an impetus, such an inside view of the act 
1 . H. Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (New York: 
Henry Holt & Co, , l93S), PP• 101-lOS. 
2 . ~., P• 102. 
3. Ibid. , P• 103. 
4 . Ibid. 
\ 
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of evolution is being resorted to . 
6. The action of the vi tal impetus is likened to an encounter with 
resistance -- "it operates in the manner of a special cause, added on to 
what we call matter, matter in this case being both an instrwnent and an 
obstacle. nl 
1. The resistance of matter divides what it defines, and such a 
division is responsible for the multiplicity of the great lines of vi tal 
evolution. 
8. The vi tal impulse began by possessing instinct and intelligence 
in a state of reciprocal implication, and these characteristics reach their 
culminating points at the extremeties of the two principal lines of animal 
evolution. In the beginning, instinct and intelligence were "mere views, 
taken from two different points, of that simple reality. n2 
9. It is impossible to forecast the 11forms which life creates in 
their entirety, by discontinuous leaps, all along the lines of its evolu-
tion. n3 
The major characteristic of Bergson 1 s doctrine of the elan-vi tal is 
the r eality of change. In his Creative Evolution, he starts by exami.n;i.ng 
the precise meaning of the word ' exist• as applied to hwna.n conscious ex:i.s-
tence. From the nature of the changes on which conscious existence is de-
signed, he arrives at his concept of Duration, as against distinct unchang-
ing elements as the reality behind psychical life- - 11we change without ceasing, 
and that the state itself is nothing but change. n4 For a conscious being, 
1. Ibid., P• 1~. 
2. Il:xi.d., P• 105. 
3 . Imd. 
t4· C. E., P• 4. 
to exist is to change, "to change is to mature, to mature is to go on 
creating oneself endlessly. "l 
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Then Bergson goes on to examine the nature of material objects or 
unorganized bodies, and living or organized bodies, and finds, in like 
manner, that the important characteristic of each is that it tends to en-
dure, and duration for both organized and unorganized bodies means the 
creation of fonns , and it becomes difficult to imagine "that the organized 
has duration and that the unorganized has not. n2 Thus, in order to know a 
living being or natural system it is necessary to get at 11 the very interval 
of duration, Wile the knowledge of an artificial or mathematical system 
applies only to the extremity. n3 The attributes which the living being 
shares with consciousness are, continuity of change, preservation of the 
past in the present, real duration. "Can we go further and say that life, 
like conscious activity, is invention, is unceasing creation. "4 
Life as invention, as unceasing creation, is implicit in the idea of 
transf ormism, the series of transformations through which one species passes 
into another, and in the natural classification of organized or living beings. 
The common fact of experience is that the highest forms of life are springing 
from a very elementary form, and this shorTS that "the most complex has been 
able to issue from the most simple by way of evolution.n5 Bergson takes up 
the problem of transforrnism as implied in the evolutionist theory, and des-
1. c.E. , P• 10. 
2. c.E. , P• 25. 
3. c.E., P• 27 . 
4 . Ibid. 
5. c.E. , P• 28 . 
cribes the genesis of "life in general" as follows : 
At a certain moment, in certain points of space, a visible 
current has taken rise; this current of life, traversing 
the bodies it has organized one after another, passing 
from generation to generation, has become divided amongst 
species and distributed amongst individuals without losing 
anything of its force, rather intensifying in proportion 
to its advance. l 
19 
Taking as an illustration Weismann 1 s theory of the "cont.i.nuity of the 
germ plasm", Bergson applies it to the continuity of genetic energy, holding. 
that it points to the view that 11 life is like a current passing from germ to 
germ through the medium of a developed organism, 11 2 and that organic evolu-
tion resembles the evolution of a consciousness. 
The quality of originality and unforseeability of forms of life is 
one which does not admit a proper explanation in terms of physico- chemical 
factors. A discussion of attempts by scientists to explain life in such 
terms results in revealing that certain orders of phenomena like anagenesis 
(the role of anagenetic energies in living tissues is to raise the inferior 
energies to their own level by assimilating inorganic substances. )seem to de-
fy physico- chemical analysis.3 
Next taken up, are the mechanistic explanations, that is, the view 
{ that regards 11 the future and the past as calculable functions of the present, 
and thus to claim that all is given. n4 Radical mechanism is rejected as it 
deprives time of its efficacy, and radical finalism (e. g. Leibnizian doctrine 
of pre- arranged bannony) is equally unacceptable as its only difference from 
1. c.E. , P• 31. 
2. C.E. , P• 32. 
a. c.E., P• 40. 
a. c.E., P• 43. 
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radical mechanism is that it "substitutes the attraction of the future for 
the imf)ulsion of the past.nl Bergson, however, admits that though his 
philosophy of life transcends both mechanism and finalism, it is nearer to 
the second doctrine than the first . 2 
Bergson then proceeds to analyze four main types of evolutionary 
t heories: 1) adaptation to outside conditions, 2) accidental and inner 
causes, 3) direct action of outer causes, 4) inheritance of variations from 
internal and external causes. The analysis is carried through an examination 
of the theories of E:i.ner, Dandn, Bateson, deVries, the Neo-Lamarckians, and 
others, and leads to their rejection. In the end Bergson returns to his 
original idea of the vi tal impetus: 
So we bome back, by a somewhat roundabout wa:y, to the idea 
we started fz:om, that of an original impetus of life, pass-
ing from one generation of germs to the follow.ing generation 
of germs through the developed organisms which bridge the 
interval between the generations. This impetus, sustained 
right along the lines of evolution among which it gets divided, 
is the fun:larnental cause of variations, at least of those that 
are regularly passed on, that accumulate and create new species. 
In general, lvhen species have begun to diverge from a common 
stock, they accentuate their dive,rgence as they progress in 
their evolution. 3 
Stress is laid on the fact that it is the same impetus which gets divided 
and brings about the creation of new species. Here, the principle of dis-
:::ociation and division of elements is introduced, at once as an explana-
tion of divergent tendencies of development, and as a refutation of mechan-
istic theories: "Life does not proceed by t he association and addition of 
elements, but by dissociation and division.n4 
1. c.E., P• L'5• 
2. c.E., P• 51 . 
3. c.E. , P• 98 . 
4. !!: c • • , P• 99. 
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Chapter I in Creative Evolution is devoted largely to the refutation 
of the existing evolutionary theories, and their rejection in favour of the 
notion of the vital impetus, which is described towards the end of the chap-
ter as "a tendency to act on inert matter. nl The positive aspect of the 
argument for the vital impetus as responsible for the divergent lines of 
evolution, is taken up from Chapter II. The direction or course of the 
evolution of life is here described on the "shell-burst" analogy. 
\. 
But it proceeds rather like a shell, which suddenlY 
bursts into tragments, which fragments , being them-
celves shells, burst in their turn into tragments des-
tined to burst again, and so on for a time inconnnensur-
e.bly long. We perceive only what is nearest to us, 
namelY the scattered movements of the pulverized ex-
plosions. From them we have to go back, stage by stage, 
to the original movement. 2 
The divergent lines of evolution are said to depen:i on tw series 
of causes, 1) the resistance life meets from inert matter, and 2) the ex-
plosive force which life bears within itself. Bergson' s main concern is to 
determine, among these divergent lines, the relation of man to the animal 
kingdom, and the place of the animal kingdom itself in the organized world. 
Taking first , the distinguishing feature between plant and animal life 
Bergson n:entions firstly, the pm1er in vegetable life of creating organic 
matter out of mineral elements drawn from air and earth, and secondly, as 
regards mobility and fixity, the balance is clearly in favour of fixity 
in the vegetable world and mobility in the animal world. 3 This leads to 
the question of relationship between mobility and consciousness. The plant 
with its tendency to fixity is unconscious; consciousness avrakens in some 
1. c.E., P• 107. 
2 . c.E., P• 109. 
3. c.E., P• 121. 
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measure in animals . "From this standpoint, and in this measure, we should 
define the animal by sensi bill ty and awakened consciousness, the vegetable 
by consciousness asleep am by insensihility. "l Another distinguishing 
feature is through the introduction of the concept of the obtaining and 
expenditure of the source of energy( solar energy for our planet): "While 
the animal evolved, not without accidents along the Hay, toward a freer and 
freer expenditure of discontinuous energy, the plant perfected rather its 
system of accumulation without moving.n2 Thus three different kingdoms are 
distinguished within the organized world - - the rricro-orgarii.sms, animals and 
vegetables, and they all represent "dissociated elements of one and the 
same origi..nal tendency.tt3 
The development of animal life takes place along the line of the 
"sensory-motor system" or the cerebro- spinal nervous system. The higher 
organism is "essentially a sensory- motor system installed on systems of 
digestion, respiration, circulation, secretion, etc., whose function it 
is to repair, cleanse and protect it, to create an unvarying internal en-
vironment for it, and above all to pass it potential energy to convert 
into locomotive movement.n4 This development allows a greater latitude 
to the living being to choose, and this is in harmony with the role of life, 
described as the insertion of "soma indetermination in matter. " 
The animal's interest lay in making itself more mobile, and its 
development took place along tw paths, along which the vertebrates and 
1. c.E. , P• 124. 
2. c.E., P• 129. 
3. c.E., P• 131. 
4. c.E., P• 138. 
83 
arthropods have separately evolved. Tre human species represents the cul-
' 
minating point of the evolution of the vertebrates.l The evolution of the 
. ' 
arthropods reaches its culminating point in the insect, and in particular, 
the lzymenoptera. 2 Tbase two lines of evolution or development, link up, 
according to Bergson, with the development of the two functions of instinct 
and intelligence: 
Now since instinct is nowhere so developed as in the insect 
world, and in no group of insects so marvelously as in the 
hymenoptera, it may be said that the whole evolution of the 
animal kingdom, apart from retrogressions toward vegetative 
life, has taken place on two divergent paths, one of which 
led to instinct and the other to intelligence. 3 
The important point for Bergson is that vegetable torpor, instinct, and 
intelligence, though elements coinciding in the vi tal impetus, have taken 
on the manifest forms in the course of development by dissociation from 
the original impetus, as opposed to dominant prevailing conceptions. 
The cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, has 
vitiated most of the philosophies of nature, is to see 
vegetative, instinctive and rational life, three suc-
cessive degrees of the developmant of one and the same 
tendency, whereas they are three divergent directions 
of an activity that has split up as it grew. The dif-
ference between them is not a differenc~ of intensity, nor, 
more generally, of degree, but of kind. 4 
Intelligence and instinct are opposite and complimentary tendencies 
for Bergson, and represent two different methods of action on invert matter: 
"Instinct perfected is a faculty of using and even of constructing organized 
instruments; intelligence perfected is t he faculty of making and using un-
1. c.E., P• 148. 
2. c.E. , P• 149. 
3· Itxi.d. 
4. Ibid. 
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organized instruments.nl The question of the respective roles af intellect 
and intuition have already been studied in connection with Bergson• s hand-
ling of the problems of epistemology and the nature of the categories , It 
will therefore suffice to note the conclusions which Bergson draws about 
these t-wo capacities and their bearing on the problem of evolution: 
Life, that is to sa:y consciousness launched into matter, 
fixed its attention either on its o•m mo v-erent or on the 
matter it was passing through; and it has thus been turned 
either in the direction of intuition or in that of intel-
lect ••• From this point of view, not only does consciousness 
appear as the motive principle of evolution, but al.so , amoo.g 
conscious beings themselves, man comes to occupy a privileged 
place. 2 
The further develop100nt of the positive argument for the vi tal im-
petus takes Bergson, in Chapter III to attempt an account of the genesis 
at the same time, of intellect and material bodies, for according to him, 
both intellect and materiality are "derived from a wider and higher fom 
of existence. n3 Part of this examination has already been reviewed in the 
last chapter. It leads to the notion of the insufficiency of the human in-
telligence to apprehend life, or reality, which it can do only when "reab-
sorbed into its principle, may thus live back again its own genesis. 114 This 
leads to the necessity of determining the categories of thought, not by in-
tellect or careful analysis, but by engendering them -- by making ourselves 
self-conscious "in the highest possible degree and then let ourselves fall 
back 1i ttle by 1i ttle. "S The theory of kno1-1ledge becomes , t hen at one w.i th 
1. c.E., P• lSS. 
2. c.E., P• 200. 
3. i!. c • • , P• 20.5. 
4. c.E., P• 210. 
5. c.E., P• 227. 
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the problem of metaphysics . 
Behind the nature of reality or "spirituality" on one hand, and 
"materiality" on the other hand, are two processes opposite in direction, 
and "we pass from the first to the second by way of inversion, or perhaps 
even by simple interruption. "! Elsewhere, Bergson speaks of two opposite 
movements, those of "ascent" and "descent" . 2 Another metaphor used is that 
of detansion and extension. 3 The analogies of the weight falling, and the 
escaping jet of steam which have been studied in the previous chapter served 
to illustrate these two opposing movexoonts or tendencies in nature . Another 
analogy presented is that of a process of making and unmaking: 
we catch a glimpse of a simple process, an action which is 
making itself across an action of the same kind which is 
unrilald.ng itself, like the fiery path torn by the last 
rocket of a fireworks displq through the black cinders 
of the spent rocketv that are falling dead.4 
At the origin of life, and the process of evolution is consciousness: 
Consciousness or supra- consciousness, is the name for 
the rocket whose extinguished fragments fall back as 
matter; consciousness again, is the name for that which 
subsists of the rocket itself, passing through the frag-
ments and lighting them up into organisms . 5 
The final analogy given as to the meaning of evolution is that of a rising 
wave: 
1 . 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Life as a whole from the initial impulse that t hrust it into 
the world, will appear as a wave which rises, and which is 
opposed by the descending movement of matter. On the greater 
c.E. , P• 220. 
c.E. , P• :1.4. 
c.E. , P• 221. 
c.E. , P• 274. 
c.E., P• 285. 
part of its surface, at different heights , the current is 
converted by matter into a vortex. At one point alone it 
passes freely, dragging with it the obstacle which will 
veigh on its progress but will not stop it. At this point 
is humanity; it is our privileged situation. l 
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A single reality which is of the nature of duration, of a vital im-
petus, an elan, caught up in opposition ani interrupted in its course, re-
sults as it were, into the twin movements of ascent and descent, of tension 
and detension, of making and unmaking . Such then is Bergson 1 s picture of 
creation and the meaning of evolution. On the side of the ascent , of making, 
and tension, is conscious life, which starts from rudimentary forms of organ-
isms and plant life and culminates in man, in freedom. On the side of des-
cent, of unmaking, or of inversion through interruption is the world of mat-
ter and space, of mechanical necessit,y and of determination. 
It is obvious that while the methods of both Alexander and Bergson 
are basically empirical, Bergson does not, like Alexander, accept the fact 
of emergent evolution with "natural piet,y" or as a brute empirical fact . 
The argument put forward in Creative Evolution is a serious and systematic 
effort to e~lain the mechanics of evolution, and the processes involved in 
the emergence or creation of new forms , qualities or species . In doing so 
he maintains the empirical method from the very outset; from his observance 
of conscious experience, through the consideration merits and demerits of 
evolutionary theories both in the positive and negative aspects, so far as 
applicable to the empirical facts of biological evolution. In the ideal 
genesis of matter and intellect, Bergson reverts to pure intuition as the 
method of apprehension of reality, and in this respect is not at variance 
with Alexander, for whom too, the basic stuff of Space-Time is to be appre-
1. C.E. , P• 293. 
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handed by intuition. It would appear, as has been seen, that both Alexander 
and Bergson tend to include, perhaps with justification, the intuition of 
reality within the embrace of the empirical method in philosophy. 
3. The Direction and Goal of Evolution 
According to Alexander, deity is the next hi.gher empirical quality 
1than mind, and God is defi_ned as the being if any, which possesses the divine 
quality or deity. l According to Alexander it is idle to hope that by defining 
God in conceptual terms(perfect being, the first cause, etc. ), we can estab-
lish a connection between such a being and the rest of experience . The qual-
i ty of deity cannot be known, for we can neither enjoy nor contemplate it. 
What we knm1 of deity is 11but its relation to the other empirical qualities 
which precede it in time. 11 2 It can be described in analogical manner as the 
colour of the universe, or by imagining finite beings called angels as a 
"pictorial emliodiment of the conception forced upon us by the fact that there 
is this series of levels of existence. n3 For any level of existence, deity 
is always the next higher empirical quality, and this fact makes deity a 
variable quality, 11 and as the world grows in time, deity changes "With it. 114 
Also, deity is not spirit, but something different from it in kind. "Spirit, 
personality, mind, all these human or mental characters belong to God but not 
, 
to his deity. They belong as we must hold not to his deity but to his ' body'"5 
1 . S. T. D. II, P• 342 . 
2. S. T. D. II, P• 347. 
3. S. T. D. II, P• 346. 
4. S. T. D. I. , , P• 348. 
5. s . T. u. II, P• 349 . 
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In answer to the question, what is the being which possesses deity? 
Alexander 1 .s answer has already been noted previously, that God is the whole 
world as possessing the quality of deity, and that of such a being, the whole 
world is the boqy and deity is the mind. l God as the possessor of deity is 
in this definition transferred from the actual to the ideal . The actual only 
exists with its nisus towards or travail with deity. On further elucidation, 
the body of God, being the whole universe, God 1 s deity is, or can be lodged 
in, only a portion of the universe. 11 2 It is the infinitude of God's deity 
which marks the difference between him and all other empirical beings. 3 
The impact of such a viel.w on the conception of God as pictured in the 
religious consciousness is that the actual God does not possess the quality 
of deity but is the universe as tending to that quality! 
Thus there is no actual infinite being with the quality of 
deity; but there is an actual infinite, the whole universe, 
with a nisus to deity; and this is the God of the religious 
consciousness, though that consciousness habitually forecasts 
the divi~ty of its object as actually realised i n an individ-
ual form. 4 
Alexander is of the opinion that the religious sentiment verifies the meta-
physical notion of a reality which is the whole world in its endeavour towards 
a new and higher empirical quality. 5 Though various emotions such as fear, 
admiration, self-abasement, are noted, the distinctive constituent of the 
religious sentiment is said to be 11 the feeling of our going out towards 
something not ourselves; with which we are in COlTJilunion, a feeling whose 
1 . S. T. D. II , P• 353; Supra, P• ll. 
2. S. T. D. II, P• 357 . 
3 . s.T • .I.) . II, P• 358 . 
. 4. S. T. D. II, P• 362 . 
5. S. T. D. II, P• 373. 
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object is not that of aey of these subsidiary or suggesting emotions, nor 
or any combination of them.nl It is also said that the metaphysical inter-
pretation of deity as that to which the world is tending is not an original 
discovery o:f lmowledge, but is "only possible to refiection working upon 
primitive notions already acquired."2 
While quality is borne by finite complexes of spa::e- time, God, as the 
possessor of deity, is a qualitied infinite. The important qualification 
which Alexander makes here , is that though there l'll3\V be actual infinites 
with primary qualities, the qualitied infinite is merely idea, because it 
is not actua1 • .3 Deity, then, is a nisus and not an accomplisltnent, and the 
attainment of deity makes deity finite : 
Deity is subject to the same law as other empirical qualities, 
and is but the next member of the series . At first a presage, 
in the lapse of time the quality comes to actual existence, 
animates a new race of creatures, and is succeeded by a still 
higher quality. God as an actual existent is always becoming 
deity but never attains it. He is the ideal God in embryo. 
The ideal when fulfilled ceases to be God, and yeti t gives 
shape and character to our conception of the flCtual God, and 
alwccy-s tends to usurp its place in our fancy . 4 
Thus, while there is alwccy-s the one universe o:f Space- Time which is God1 s 
body, the empirical constitution and its deity varies : 11 No matter therefore 
what quality the deity of God may be, his body" is always the whole Space- Time."5 
Alexander 1 s conception of the deity as a variable quality, and as a 
nisus and not an accomplishment is not incompatible with the position of 
1 . S. T. D. Ir, P• .37.3. 
2. S. T. D. II, P• .375. 
.3 . S. T. D. II, P• .364 • 
4 . S. T. D. II, P• 365. 
5 . S. T. D. II, P• .366. 
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Bergson, who while be rejects radical mechanism outright, does not like-wise 
reject finalism entirely, but maintains that his oWl} theory "will necessarily 
partake of finalis.m to a certain extent. nl 
Bergson commences by breaking up the notion of finality into the twin 
ideas of external finalit,y,(according to which living beings are ordered with 
regard to each other), and internal finality( each being mcde for itself, all 
its parts conspire for the greatest good of the whole) . Tbe position of vital-
ism on this issue is that "there is neither purely internal finality nor ab-
solutely distinct individuality. n2 On the question of where the vital prin-
ciple of the individual begins and ends, Bergson trac.es the ancestry of in-
dividuality ri~t back to 11 that little mass of protoplasmic jelly 'Which is 
probably at the root of the genealogical tree of life. 113 The individual 
having descended from such a common ancestor remains united with the totality 
of living beings, and so for Bergson, the principle of internal finali v can-
not be applied to the individuality of the living being. 
If there is finality in the world of life, it includes the 
whole of life in a single indiviSible embrace ••• But it(life) 
forms a single whole none the less; and we have to choose 
between the out- and-out negation of finality and the hypo-
thesis which co- ordinates not only the parts of an organism 
with the organism itself, but also each living being with the 
collective whole of all others. 4 
The strict application of the principle of finality, like that of the 
principle of mechanical causality leads to the conclusion that "all is given," 
and agrees in doing away with time . We do not , according to Bergson think 
l . c.E., P• 46. 
2. c.E., P• 49. 
3. Ibid. 
4· c. E., P• 50. 
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real time, but we live it.l He speaks of the feeling we have of our evolu-
tion and of the evolution of all things in pure duration as being there, 
forming around the intellectual concept as an "indistinct fringe.n2 In order 
to arrive at an adequate theory of life we must invoke to our aid this 
. n fringe of vague intuition that surrounds our distinct--that is, intellectual--
representation.n3 Such a philosophy transcends both nechanism and finalism 
but is nearer the second than the first: 
Like radical fin'alism, although in a vaguer form, our 
philosopey represents the organized world as a harmonious 
whole. But this harmony is far from being as perfect as 
it has been claimed to be. It adrd ts of much discord, be-
cause each species, each individual even, retains only a 
certain impetus from the universal vital impulsion and 
tends to use this en~rgy in its own interest. In this 
consists adaptation. 4 
Thus, though the original impulse is common, as we ascend the stream 
of life, the more do diverse tendencies appear, which are complementary to 
each other. Harmony, for Bergson, is 11 behind11 rather than "before", and he 
recognizes an identity of impulsion, but not a common end or aspiration. 
"It would be futile to try to assign to life an end, in the human sense of 
the word. " 5 The elan vi tal conforms to no prearranged plan or end in its 
progress, but once the road has been travelled we ma;y look back and note 
the direction traversed and speak as if there had been pursuit of an end; 
but the road "has been created~ 12assu with the act of travelling over 
1. c.E., P• 53. 
2. c.E., P• 53. 
3. c.E., P• 56. 
4. c.E., P• 58. 
5. c.E., P• 58. 
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it, being nothing but the direction of this act itself. "l The hwnan mind can 
have nothing to say of the road which was going to be travelled. 
To sum up, life, "from its origin, is the continuation of one and the 
same impetus , divided into divergent lines of evolution. 11 2 Life is also a 
tendency to act on inert matter. Bergson is emphatic that no plan or end 
is implied in such action. 11 The direction of this action is not predeter-
mined; hence the unforseeable variety of fonns which life, in evol ving, 
sows along its path. n3 
It~ be noted in comparison, that Alexander ' s deity also carries 
with it the notion of unpredictability, for what the quality is cannot be 
known in advance , it being neitber possible to enjoy, nor to contemplate it. 
Again, the deity is a variable quality, and as the world grows in time, 
deity changes wi. th it. The Bergsonian description of life as "invention, 
is unceasing creation,n4 is not far removed from the description of deity 
as a "nisus and not an accomplishment. "5 Both descriptions tend to keep the 
direction of evolution open-ended. 
4 . Chai.ce, Free-will and Determination 
The problem of freedom and det ermination arises in Alexander ' s system 
as one of the relations of empirical things to the non- empirical or categori-
cal, and their relation to one another , which arise from their being related 
1. c.E. , P• 59 . 
2. c.E. , P• 60. 
3. c.E., P• 107. 
4. c.E., P• 27. 
5. S. T. D. II, P• 364. 
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to one another consequent on being contained within the one Space- Time. 1 The 
problem of freedom is also connected with the category of cawsality, and the 
notion that categories are the pervasive features of all finite existents . 
The processes within a substance are in direct or indirect causal relation 
with one another, and the thing therefore acts in a detennined wq. This 
applies to the mind, which is subject to determination like all other things . 2 
11 But the mind enjoys its own life and the causal interrelation of its states 
is enjoyed as freedom. "3 
Now mental processes affect each other causally, and any one process 
may be either the cause or the effect of a non-mental one. The consciousness 
of freedom is defined as follows: 
It will be sean that freedom is nothing but the form which 
causal action assumes when both cause and effect are enjoyed; 
so that freedom is determination as enjoyed, or in enjoyment, 
and human freedom is a case of something universal which is 
found wherever the distinction of enjoynent ~d contemplation, 
in the widest sense of those terms, is found. 4 
Enjoyed determination is clarified to be that type of determination in 
which both the detenniner and the detenn.ined are enjoyed. The other two 
cases envisaged are wen lx>th events are contemplated, and when one of the 
members of the relation is contemplated, and the other enjoyed. 5 The propo-
sition that freedom is determination in enjo,yment, Alexander holds, is the 
same as that freedom is self- determination, thoogh it i s said to be more general.6 
1 . S. T. D. II, P• 74. 6 . S. T. D. II, P• 316. 
2. S. T. D. II, P• 78. 
3. S. T. D. II, P• 78. 
~ . S. T. D. II, P• 315 . 
5. S. T. D. II, P• 316. 
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Alexander illustrates his coreept of enjoyed determination 'tu the 
case of a passion of a~er inducing the idea of striking: "In the continu-
ously enjoyed passage from motive to idea of action and thence to this last 
effective mental act I enjoy myself as willing ani as willing freely, •l1The 
most obvious case of unfreedom of will is cited as action under physical 
compulsion, when our action is detennined not by an enjoyment, but by a 
physical cause. 2 Alexander makes the general statement that 11we feel free 
or unfree according as a mental state is or is not enjoyed as detennined 
by a prior mental state or the outcome of it. n3 
Observation of experience reveals that we enjoy determination by 
our mental states and disposition, and bringsup the question of choosing 
between two alternative courses . In the case of a physical body the effect 
is the resultant of the two forces operating on the body, whereas in choosing 
one or other motive is adopted, and the other disregarded. Here, according 
to Alexander, the response on the mental level is not separated by an abso-
lute difference, because we 11act from our characters," that is, in the line 
of least resistance. 4 
There is nothing in free mental action which is incompatible 
with thorough determinisill• Neither is such determinism in-
compatible with novelty.~ 
The novelty alleged to be distinctive of free-will means human action is 
not wholly predictable. 6 Alexander finds that detenninism is not incompatible 
1. S. T. D. II, P• 316. 6 . S. T. D. II, p. 324. 
2. S. T. D. II, P• 317. 
3. S. T. D. II, P• 318. 
4. S. T. D. II, P• 322. 
5. S. T. D. II, p . 323. 
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with unpredictabili tyt 
Determinism in mind is therefore not incompatible with 
unpredictability; and we have seen the reason, that the 
predictor is a mind, and while he may predict h~an 
future regarded as a contemplated object, that is in 
physiological terms, he cannot predict it wholly in 
mental terms . 1 
Not only can IOOntal action be determined and yet unpredictable, it may 
be free and yet necessary. 2 11But the necessity which the ldll obeys is 
the necessi~ of causation, the determinate sequence of event upon its 
conditions. ") It follows therefore, that freedom does not mean indetermi-
nation. Again, freedom does not mean ignorance of the real causes of action--
it ~ans awareness of them: "We are most fu.lly conscious of freedom when we 
are JOOst aware of our acts proceeding from ourselves. n4 The concluding re-
marks of Alexander are notewor thy: 
Freedom then, is determination in enjoyment, and we have 
seen that it involves no feature save enjoyment which dis-
tinguishes it from natural or physical action, which is 
contemplated. Not all human action is free . When it is 
unfree its determinants are not present in enjoyment. But 
when free action in turn becomes the object of conteJ~~Rlation 
it falls into the class of determined natural action. 5 
Bergson • s treatment of the problem of freedom and determination stems 
from his conception of real concrete duration ani the specific feeling of 
duration which our consciousness is capable of experiencing. At the root 
of most errors in philosophy he finds a confusion between concrete duration 
1 . S. T.D. II, P• 327 . 
2. S.T.D. II, P• 329. 
3. S. T. D. II, P• 329. 
h. S. T.D. II , P• 331. 
5. S. T. D. II, P• 332. 
and the abstract time which mathematics, physics, and even language and 
coJ'IIIllon sense, substitute for it. He writes in his preface to Time and 
Free Will: 
What I attempt to prove is that all discussion between the 
determinists and their opponents implies a previous confu-
sion of duration with extensity, of succession with simul-
taneity, of quality with quantity; this confusion once dis-
pelled, we may perhaps witness the disappearance of the 
objections raised against free will , of the defini tiona given 
of it, and, in a certain sense, of the problem of free will 
itself. l 
In his discussion of the concept of causality, Bergson distinguishes 
between active duration and apparent causality: 
In short, whether we study Cartesian physics, Spinozistic 
metaphysics , or the scientific theories of our own time , 
we shall find evezywhere the same anxiety to establish a 
rel ation of logical necessity between cause and effect, 
and we shall see that this anxiety shows itself in a 
tendenc.y to transform relations of succession into rela-
tions of inherence, to do awq with active duration, and 
to substitute for apparent causality a fundanental identity. 2 
As against the above mechanistic attitude towards causality is the secorxi 
conception, wherein an effort is made to explain 11 the regular succession of 
causes and effects by a real deus ex machina: sometimes it was a Necessity 
external to things and hovering over them, sometimes an inner Reason acting 
by rules womewhat similar to those which govern our own conduct."3 
Bergson, in his own interpretation of causali -cy- makes the stipulation 
that the relation of inner causality is purely dynamic, and has no analogy 
"wit)l the rel ation of two external phenomena which condition one another. u4 
1 . Bergson, Time and Free Will (London: G. A. & Unwin, 1921) , P• xx. 
2 . Ibid., P• 209. 
3 . Ibid., P• 214. 
4 . Ibid., P• 219. 
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nFor, as the latter are capable of recurring in a homogeneous space, their 
relation can be expressed in terms of a law, whereas deep- seated psychic 
states occur once in consciousness and will never occur again. nl Bergson 
formulates his concept of freedom as follows: 
Freedom is the relation of the concrete self to the act 
which it performs . This relation is indefinable, just 
because we are free . For we can analyse a thing, but 
not a process; we can break up extensity, but not duration ••• 
By the very fact of breaking up corerete ti.rne we set out its 
moments in homogeneous space; in place of the doing we put 
the already done; and, as we have begun by, so to speak, 
stereotyping the activity of the self, we see spontaneity 
settle down into inertia and freedom into necessity. Thus, 
any positive definition of freedom will ensure the victory 
of determinism. 2 
Several passages of Creative Evolution support the contention, that 
it is only by the intuitive apprehension of the nature of reality or dura-
tion in consciousness that freedom of action can be attained: 
We must, by a strong recoil of our personality on itself, 
gather up our past which is slipping away, in order to 
thrust it, compact and undivided, into a present which 
it will create by entering. Rare indeed are the moments 
when we are self-possessed to t~s extent: it is then 
that our actions are truly free . 
And again: 
The more we succeed in IIB.king ourselves conscious of our 
progress in pure duration , too more we feel the different 
parts of our being enter into each other, and our whole 
personality concentrate itself in a point, or rather a 
sharp edge, pressed against the future and cutting into 
it unceasingly. It is in this that life and action are free . 4 
FJ.sewhere, he speaks of the connection between knowledge and action, and 
1 . Ibid., P• 219. 
2. Ibid., P• 220. 
3. c.E., P• 219 . 
h. c.E., P• 220. 
the function of the intelligence in this respect: 
To act and to know that we are acting, to come in touch 
with reality and even to live it, but only in tb:! measure 
in which it concerns the work that is being accomplished 
and the furrow that is being plowed, such is tba function 
of human intelligence. l 
Creation itself, in Bergson' s view is a "free act, and the life 
within the material world participates in this li bert;y • 11 2 Presenting his 
analogy of the worlds shooting out from rockets in a fire- to.'Orks di. splq--
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he seems to reoognize tba need of positing a centre from which worlds shoot 
out, and arrives at a definition of God: "God thus defined, has nothing of 
the already made; He is unceasi~ life, action, freedom.n3 There seems to 
be the semblance of the idea of God as the first cause in this conception. 
In the Two Sources of Morali. ty and Religion, he not only identifies 
the elan- vi tal with God, but indicates a return to God as the destiny of man: 
Bei~s have been called into existence who were destined to 
love and be loved, since creative energy is to be defined 
as love. Distinct from God, Who is this energy itself, 
they could spring into being only in. a universe, and there-
fore the universe sprang into being. 4 
The human race is set the ideal or goal before it, of breaking through the 
resistance of materiality, and getting back to God--the path or wa:y of 
achieving which has been shown by the mystics . "They have blazed a trail 
along which other men may pass. They have, by this very act, shown to the 
philosopher the whence and whither of life. n5 The book ends with the fol-
1. c.E., P• 210. 
2. c.E. , P• 270. 
3. c.E., P• 271. 
L. T. S. M. R., P• 246. 
5. Ibid. 
-
lowing note on the destiny of mankind: 
Mankind lies groaning, half crushed beneath the weight of 
its own progress . Men do not sufficiently realize that 
their future is in their own hands. Theirs is the task 
of determining first of all whether they want to go living 
or not . Theirs the r esponsibility, then, for deciding if they 
want mere]J" w live, or intend to make just the extra effort 
required for fuli'illing, even on their refractory planet, 
the essential functi at of the uni. verse, which is a machine 
for the making of gods . l 
There seem to be hints in the above passages of God being both the first 
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and final causes, even though Bergson is opposed to the idea of an end or 
finalism in the process of evolution, as has alreacy been noted. However, 
the idea that man Il1a\Y somehow occupy a special place in the process of 
evolution does appear in Creative Evolution also: 
With man, consciousness breaks the chain. In man, and in 
man alone, it sets itself free ••• But man not only maintains 
his machine, he succeeds in usi:r:g it as he pleases. 2 
And again: 
They let us guess that, while at the end of the vast spring-
board from which life bas taken its leap, all the others 
have stepped down, finding the cord stretched -roo high, man 
alone has cleared the obstacle. It is in this quite special 
sense that man is the "term" and the nend" of evolution. 3 
In the final identification of the creative energy with God, Bergson 
is not unlike Alexander, who towards the close of hi. s Space, Time , and Deity , 
identifies his universe of basic stuff of Space- Time with the bocy of God. 
Both the philosophers point in some wa:y or form towards the advent of a new 
or superior race of men. It would be imprudent, however , to press wo closely 
for similarities only, for there are significant differences in the two 
1. T. S. M. R., P• 306. 
2. C.E. , P• 288. 
3. c.E. , P• 289. 
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treatments of causality and free will. Causality as a category in Alexander's 
system, is a pervasive feature of all finite existents, including human 
beings, but carries with it no notion of power . Bergson's duration on the 
other hand, is of the nature of an impetus, and carries the notion of a 
will and action in its very nature and conception. For this reasoy., Alexan-
der's concept of freedom as determination in enjoyment does not amount to 
the same thing as Bergson's intuition of the elan with its concomitant sense 
of freedom of action. Each is unique in the wa:y in which the ultimate 
reality, Space-Time in one case, and duration in the other, is matia to ac-
count for the categorical and empirical features of the world, and the pro-
cess of evolution, as revealed on emprrical observation and reflection, and 
though there are similarities in certain conclusions reached, there are 
also, important differences . This is as it should be, for it is due to the 
fact that the nature of the ultimate reality in the two systems, though 
similar in some i'la:ys, is also different in important respects. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Each age has its faith and its dominant zeitgeist by which the masses 
of people are permeated, and according to Radhakrishnan, our age is committed 
to science. l Elsewhere in the History of Philosophz edited by him, Evolution-
ism is said to be the zeitgeist or the spirit of the times. 2 Tm se two views 
need not be held to be contradictory, for it happens that sane of the most 
important of the scientific philosophers of the tlventieth century like Alexan-
der, Lloyd Morgan, Whitehead and Eddington seem to favour an evolutionary 
view in philosophy. 
( It has been said that philosophies of Evolution are the result of 
the influence of biology on the philosophers of the nineteenth century. 
I The publication of Darwin ' s Origin of Species was noteworthy, among other 
things, for being responsible for creating a shift in interest in the pre-
1 
/ vailing scientific outlook, from an engrossing preoccupation with the phy-
\ sical sciences to biology. With the ris e of science in the seventeenth and 
' eighteenth centuries, and in particular the sci ence of physics to a position 
of over-awing importance, there seemed to have been created a gulf between 
the inorganic world, ani the world of animals and plants -- of man and the 
' I human realm of values . According to Dewey, it was in the filling up of this I void between the material and vital worlds that Darwin ' s contributioo to 
\ philosopey lay: 
1 . Radhakrishnan et. al . ed. History of Philosophy, Vol. II. p.J~o . 
2. ~., Vol. I . P• 544. 
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I 
.. 
I But prior to Darwin the impact of the new scientific method upon life, mind, and politics, had been arrested, because 
between these ideal and moral interests and the inorganic 
world intervened the kingdom of plants and animals • The 
gates of the garden of life were barred to the new ideas; 
and on.ly through this garden was there access to mind and 
politics . The influence of Darwin upon philosopny resides 
in his having COIX:IUered the phenomena of lif e for the 
principle of transition , and thereby freed the new logic 
for application to mind and morals and life . When he said of 
species what Galilee had said of the earth, 'e pur se muove, ' 
he emancipated, once for all, genetic and experimental ideas 
as an organon of asking questions and looking for explanations. l 
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The Evolutionism of Spencer, Bergson, Lloyd Morgan, Alexander, and Whitehead, 
therefore fall in their natural sequence as the philos~hic repercussions of 
-.the impact of the Darwinian or scientific method on the ' garden of life.' 
Though the idea of Evolutionism did receive a boost, as it were, 
from the rise of biological science in the nimteenth century, it is also 
true that the idea is by no means an entirely new one in the history of 
philosophical speculation . In fact, the idea has tinged metapeysical 
thought since the very begirmings of Westem philosophy. It is present 
even in the Ionian speculation of the nature of things or Physis, which 
Aristotle ranked under the head of material cause, and defined as "that of 
which all things consist, the first from which they come to be, the last into 
which they are resolved{ the substance remaining, but changing in its modifi-
cations) . n2 In tnis very definition of the nature of things, the germ of 
the evolutionary idea ma.Y be said to have been captured. 
Cornford traces back the starting point or datum of Greek philosophy 
to the Greek religion and earlier sources, and discovers in the metaphysical 
entity of the first philosophers, "not merely a natural element, but an ele-
1. J . Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy( New York: Henry Holt & 
eo., 1910) . P• B. 
2. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, Chapter 2 . P. 983f 10. 
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ment endowed with supernatural life and powers, a substance which is also 
Soul and God. "l In the triple aspect of substance, soul, am God, the 
physis of the Ionians incorporates features which can be traced through the 
ages , in the speculation alx>ut the nature of metaphysical reality, even d:>wn 
to the Space- Time of Alexander and the elan-vi tal of Bergson. According to 
Cornford, the statement that the All is alive or bas soul in it accounts for 
the mobility of pl')rsis . 2 Apart from motion which is due to its life, another 
function of the soul distinguished by Carnford is that of knowing, which was 
not at first distinguished from motion. 3 The concepts of motion, of soul 
and life, consciousness or awareness, find expression in the nature of 
reality as discussed both by Alexander and by Bergson, oouched undoubtedly, 
in language and ter.minolqgy acceptable to the scientific and empirical tra-
diti ons. 
Another aspect of the religioo.s heritage which is associated with 
the soul- substance of ancient philosophy is the ccncept of the logos : "To 
the mysticism of all ages , the visibl e world is a myth, a tale half true 
and half false , embodying a logos , the truth which is one. 114 According to 
Zielinski, the divine Logos, whi..cb became so important for Christian theology, 
had its origin in Greek religion, and not in philosophy. 5 He writes of the 
symbolic conception of the god Pan in the poems of Homer -- a conception 
symbolic of the double form of God, the perfect and true, and in the apparent 
1 . Cornford, From Religion to Philosop~, P• 123. 
2 • .Ll:xi.d., P• 128. 
3. Ibid., P• 132. 
4. Ibid., P• 187. 
5. T. Aielinski, The Religion of Ancient Greece . (London: Humphrey Milford, 
1926), P• 205 . 
lower empirical nature: 
And if we conceive of Pan in a double form, this has a 
symbolic sense--Pan is the word (logos) . And the word 
has a double form, being both truthful and lying, 
abiding by its true essence on the heights in communion 
'With the gods, and by its lying essence in a lower sphere , 
which alone corresponds to its ' goatish ' nature . l 
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Drawing upon the Greek and Christian religions, the major philosophies 
of the Western tradition, the systems of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and 
Aquinas have certain features in conunon as an inheritance from the religious 
tradition. In all these systems the Deity is in sone w:q identified ld th 
the eternal, the changeless and the perfect, and the phenomenal world is 
held to be a degredation of the perfection embodied in the Deity. The Deity 
is envisaged in different ways , and by different means, both as the source 
and the end of phenomenal existence. 
Another fonn in which the same idea finds expression is by the philo-
sophical method which goes by the name of dialectic. In the dialectics of 
Heraclitus, the coooept of the soul an:i logos takes the form of a dialectical 
movement of the one living, and divine soul substance embodied in fire, 
which perpetually dies into its transformations ani is reoorn again. In the 
modern Hegelian version of dialectics , can be traced, according to Siegfried 
Marek, the self-same idea. 
In the ultimate analysis the entire finite sphere, compoved of 
both nature and the human mind, is considered a self- alienation 
of God from himself . Then positive dialectics consist in self 
reconciliation of the Divine Mind ldth himself . 2 
The seed of the evolutimary idea being thus contained in the religious 
1 . Ibid., P• 189. 
2. V. Fenn, (ed. ) . A Histo~ of Philosophical Systems . (New York : The 
Philosophical Library, 19 0) , P• 300. 
., 
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and philosophical heri tage of the earliest times, any appraisal of the 
modern theories of evolution such as those of Alexander and Bergson may well 
be carried out against the context of such a heritage. One common feablre 
in the systems of both Alexander and Ber&son which is worth mentioning at 
the very outset is that they are both anti-mechanistic and unite in giving 
the lie to the proposition that science and the empirical method commits 
one to a mechanistic view. In both systems the nature of reality is supra-
physical and super-sensual, and associated in some manner with Deity and God. 
One of the m::>st mteworthy features of Alexander 1 s systan is his 
identification of Space-Time with the manifold of being or existence, and 
simultaneously, the identification of the Space and Time as discussed by 
the psychologist, the physicist and the mathematician. Not only are the 
psychologist, and the physicist am the mathematician urrl. ted with the 
philosopher in the ontological study of being, but the universe of Space-
\ Time is identified with the body of God. The man of religion is thus 
brought into the company of the philosopher, the psychologist, the physicist 
and the mathematician in the cormnon enterprise of the study of metaphysical 
reality. Finite or determinate being for Alexander, becomes a detenni nate 
portion of the Infinite Being of God. The space and Time of detenninate 
being becane the limiting or determinate coordinates of tre body of God which 
is infinite in extent and duration, that is, both :infinite and eternal. l 
It is contended that the above propositions const.i. tute one of the 
m~st important ani significant contribution~ to philosophical thought since 
the period of the Renaissance and the rise of science. The importance lies 
~in the vast possibilities which such a view opens up for an intercourse and 
1. S.T. D. II, P• 358. 
\ 
\ 
# \ 
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reapproachment between philosophy, and on the one hand with the datwu of 
the religious sentiment aiXi eJq>erience, and on the other hand, with modern 
developments and treoos in Phsics, Mathematics and Psychology. Alexander 
has opened a vast and fascinating field for an integrated approach and study 
of these several subjects, and the future develop~nt of philosopey may well 
follow on the lines of such a reapproachment and intercourse . As an example 
\ of work on such lines ~ be cited an article entitled 11 Space, Time, and 
Space- Time, 11 by R. M. Millard in the Philoso1iJ.ical Farwu, Vol. XIII, 1955. 
It is one of the paradoxes of AJ.exander's system that it is precisely 
1 where possibilities of reapproachment between science and philosophy can be 
1 of greatest meaningfulness, that his s,ystem presents difficulties of appli-
/ cation. In the Space-Time manifold of his scheme there is no concept of 
\ energy or power involved as a categorical or pervasive feature, and this would appear to be at variance with the findings of modern phy.sics ••• The 
relativistic concepts of the field, and the equation of mass and energy 
necessitate the associat~on of energy with both mass and the relativistic 
\ field in the space-t.:i.me cmtinuum.: 
Matter is where the concentration of energy is great, field 
where the concentration of energy is small. But if tJ"Iis is 
the case, then the difference between matter and field is a 
quantitative rather than a qualitative one . There is no 
sense in regarding matter ~nd field as two qualities quite 
different from each other. l. 
With Bergson, the tendency to react against materialism and mechanism 
leads as it were to an anti thesis, and a philosoJ:bical system which leans so 
heavily towards the spiritual nature of reality, that the material world 
suffers a considerable loss of reality. Bergson's spiritual reality bursts 
1 . A.Einstein and L. Infeld, The Evolution of PJvsics(Cambridge:University 
Press, 1938), P• 257. 
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into the urd. verse with all the ncrl.se and splendour of an exploding rocket, 
\ 
but all that it 
explosion. The 
leaves of the physical world are the charred remains of the 
reason for such a vi ew may be due, as Alexander points out, 
to Gergson ' s conception of geometrical space or it m~ be due to his persis-
\tent denial of being to the elan vi tal . The reality of change is the only 
r eality conceded. The concept of being is treated as an illusion, and as a 
result, the physical world is reduced to the dead weight of the reJTUlants, or 
the spent force of the vital impetus, out of which both the force and the 
/
life have been extinguished. Yet the fact remains that the physical world 
is no less real even though it changes and endures, and it is its very being 
\ which makes change possible. 
I In the speculations of the ancient Greeks, science, metaphysics and 
religion very often intermingled and joined hands, but in these speculations 
there was much that would not pass muster in the light of modern advances in 
With the trend of scientific and empirical philosophy as evidenced 
in theories of evolution, the way seems to have been paved for a fresh re-
approachroent and synthesis of the varied directions which man's search for 
truth has taken, and the materials for such a synthesis are vast, and rich, 
and varied, far beyond the dreams of the ancients . Not only has science 
advanced beyond recognition on all sides, but the study of comparative reli-
gi.ons has revealed far greater insights and depths of religious experience 
than the ancients were aware of . If metaphysics cannot afford to ignore the 
evidence of science, neither can it afford to ignore the datum of the religious 
sentiment and experience, and both Alexander and Bergson have recognized this 
fact by the inclusicn of the religirus datum within the orbit of the empirical 
method. ~hey have both paved and pointed out the way for a greater measure 
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I 
of appreciation and intercourse in the philosophical speculation of the 
future, between science, philosophy and religion, and though neither of them 
l may have spoken the last word, have both made significant and valuable con-
~ tributions in that direction. 
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